JOGI KAR Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a reference by the Additional Sessions Judge of Midnapur, recommending that the accused persons in this case should be acquitted. The unanimous verdict of the jury convicted them of offences under Secs.326 and 147, I.P.C.

(2.) Before dealing with the merits of the case, I should like to say a few words about the letter of reference submitted by the learned Judge. A letter of reference ordinarily should state the case and the verdict of the jury and concisely the ground upon which the learned Judge differs from that verdict and considers it necessary, in the ends of justice, to submit the case to this Court under Section 307, Criminal P.C. What the learned Judge has done in this case is that he has given a detailed criticizm of the evidence by the prosecution and by the defence and in the conclusion he expresses his agreement with the point of view urged on behalf of the accused. The recommendation made by the learned Judge that the accused should be acquitted has been based by him on the view that, on the evidence in this case, the accused should have been given the benefit of doubt and he could not agree with the verdict of the jury because their appreciation of evidence seemed not to be proper. These are hardly grounds for a reference under Section 307, Criminal P.C. The duty of the referring Judge is laid down in that section : that when he is clearly of opinion that it is necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case to the High Court, he shall submit the case accordingly recording the grounds of his opinion. The letter of reference cannot be said to satisfy the requirements of the law.

(3.) Now, what we have to do in this case is to find whether the verdict of the jury is so perverse and unreasonable as to demand our interference with it. It is hardly necessary to say that the current of decisions since the case of Queen V/s. Sham Bagdi [1873] 13 B.L.R. App. 19 had been that this Court should be reluctant to interfere with the unanimous verdict of the jury unless it is manifestly wrong and unless it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice. Of course, any crystallized rule of law cannot be laid down to guide the Courts in every case that comes before it, but it is now accepted that this Court will not interfere with the unanimous verdict of the jury, unless it is of opinion that it is unreasonable on the particular facts of the case. Keeping this principle in mind, I have to examine the merits of this case, not in the light of the verdict I myself might have returned, if I were sitting as a Court of fact, but to consider whether the jury had any ground on which they could base their verdict.