(1.) Defendant 2 is the appellant before me. The plaintiffs, four in number, filed the original suit for partition and delivery of four out of seven shares in the property described in the plaint schedule, which the plaintiffs allege belonged to one Chandrayya, the last male holder. Chandrayya died about 1876 leaving a widow Punnamma. Punnamma died on 24 March 1924, and the present suit for partition was filed on 2 May, 1924. Defendant 4 and defendants 1 and 2 are cousins of the plaintiffs and are according to the plaintiffs the other three sharers who are entitled to the other three shares in the property as reversioners to the estate of Chandrayya.
(2.) The main pleas of the appellant, who was defendant 2 in the lower Court, were that the properties did not belong to Chandrayya and that defendant 2 had been adopted to Chandrayya after Chandrayya's death by his widow. Both the lower Courts held against the defences set up by defendant 2, and the first contention has been reiterated before me hers. Both the lower Courts held against the validity of the adoption and that question is not before me in second appeal.
(3.) The substantial ground taken in second appeal before me by the learned advocate for the appellant Mr. Lakshmanna is this. The onus of proving that the property claimed by the reversioners was the property of the last male holder is heavily upon the plaintiffs. There is no presumption that any property in the possession of a Hindu widow or Hindu female was the property of either her husband or any male ancestor. I agree that this proposition could not possibly be contested. The leading case on the subject is the decision of the Privy Council in Dewan Run Bijai Buhadur Singh V/s. Indarpal Singh [1899] 26 Cal. 871, where their Lordships had to consider the case of a Hindu widow in possession of large properties. It was proved in that case that the husband was very rich. The privy Council held that the fact that the husband was rich did not in any way go to prove that the property in the possession of the widow was the property of the husband. The privy Council held that the onus of proof was on the reversioners, and he had to prove that the property claimed by him was property belonging to the estate of the last male holder as reversioner to whose estate, he claims the property. This decision was followed by a Bench of this Court, consisting of Spencer and Srinivasa Iyengar, JJ. In Vikrama Deo Garu V/s. Vikrama Deo Maharajulugaru [1918] 33 M.L.J. 665, where their Lordships went further and observed that the presumption that a person in possession of property is the owner and absolute owner thereof applied equally to Hindu women also. It is therefore clear that the onus in the present case lies heavily on four plaintiffs who, as reversioners, claim their 4/7ths share of the suit properties. On such proof that these properties were the properties of Chandrayya, both the lower Courts found that the plaintiffs are entitled to their shares of the properties.