MALLA LATCHAYYA Vs. TRUSTEE OF SRI SRI SRI VASUDEVASWAMI VARU SRI SRI SRINIVASA RAJMANI RAJA DEO GARU RAJAH OF MANDASA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The zemindar of Mandasa is the plaintiff and the defendants are his tenants of the Pidi Mandasa village. In 1923 the zemindar filed suits against his tenants in the Civil and Revenue Courts for rent in respect of Faslis 1329 to 1331. During the pendency of these suits, the agreement, Ex. A, was executed and in pursuance of it the plaintiff withdrew those suits and they were dismissed. Generally stated Ex. A provided, amongst other things, that the zemindar should withdraw his suits, that accounts of arrears from fasli 1325 should be looked into within 15 days from the date of the agreement and within a further period of 15 days the ryots should pay the balances that may be found due according to the D.C.B and other accounts and duplicate receipts. It also provided that if the ryots failed to make the payments according to the terms of the agreement and the accounts of the zemindar he may file suits for arrears found due from fasli 1325 and for costs. The agreement ended with the statement that the "withdrawal of the suits now pending in the Court constitutes verily the consideration for this agreement." As the tenants failed to make the payments according to Ex. A, the zemindar filed various suits against them and recovered the arrears from them together with interest. These civil revision petitions have been filed by the tenants against the decrees in those suits.

(2.) In support of these civil revision petitions Mr. Jagannadha Doss urged mainly three grounds: (1) That the lower Court, i.e., the District Munsif's Court of Sompeta, had no jurisdiction to try these suits, they being essentially suits for rent which are cognizable only by the Revenue Courts under the Estates Land Act, (2) That the agreement, Ex. A, is unenforceable as its effect is to defeat the provisions of the Estates Land Act, such as as 189, 199 and 211 and (3) that interest on the amounts due should not have been awarded by the lower Court. We will deal with these points in order.

(3.) Point No. 1. It is argued that though suits are nominally for amounts due under Ex. A, those amounts really represent the rents due from the tenants for the various faslis and that, therefore, the suits in question should have been filed only in the Revenue Courts under the provisions of the Estates Land Act. (See Section 77and 189 read with the schedule of the Act.) This argument is met with the reply that the present suits are in no sense suits to recover rents but are in substance as in form suits to enforce the plaintiff's rights under Ex. A which constitutes altogether a new cause of action. The terms of the document which we have set forth above show that the intention of the parties was to supersede the old liability and substitute in its place a new cause of action. The parties are conscious that a new contract is substituted because they specifically state at the end of the document what the consideration for the new contract is. If the tenants by this document were only agreeing to pay what they were bound to pay before, they would not point out the new consideration for the agreement. Further they contemplate the filing of fresh suits and also provide for costs of such suits. That Ex. A embodies a new cause of action is also clear from the fact that the zemindar under it is entitled to get from the tenants the rents for faslis which were admittedly barred at the time when Ex. A was executed. Not only was the barred liability kept alive but it was also plainly sought to be enforced. A careful perusal of its terms makes it difficult to accept the suggestion that it does no more than make the old obligation matter of record. In this connection attention may be drawn to the decisions in Ibrahim Malick V/s. Lalit Mohan Roy and Royzuddi Sheik V/s. Kali Nath Mookerjee 33 C. 985 : 4 C.L.J. 219 referred to by the lower Court, In the former case a suit was instituted in a Small Cause Court on the strength of a verbal promise to pay a rent-decree amount in consideration of not enforcing the said decree, It was held that "the suit was on a contract no doubt with reference to the amount found due by the judgment but it is a suit on a simple contract and no exception can be taken to the frame of it." In the latter case, of bond was taken for "arrears of rent for amount of a rent decree and for cesses etc." It was held that the "suit to enforce the bond was in no sense a suit to enforce the original rent charge," In our opinion in the present case the old obligation to pay rent was superseded by the new agreement under Ex. A which created a new liability. For these reasons we hold that the lower Court had jurisdiction to try these suits.