RAMALINGA MUDALIAR Vs. TSRAMASWAMI IYER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The defendants apply for a certificate of leave to appeal to the King in council. One of the questions raised in the suit was, whether the village in which the suit lands are situate, is an estate or not within the meaning of the Estates Lund Act. It was inter alia contended for the defence that the village in question is an unsettled jagir under Section 3(2)(c). We have held that the grant was not a jagir grant but an inam grant which falls within Sub-clause (d). We have further held that, under the Exception to Section 8 the inamdar acquired the kudivaram interest and the plots in question have, therefore, ceased to be parts of an estate. The contention of the defendants that they are entitled to occupancy rights has also been rejected.

(2.) The judgment of this Court is a confirming judgment. The plaintiff sought to recover in the suit possession of three Gidangadis or betel plots known as Veerapan, Kadapetham and Baker Gidangadis. The learned District Judge disallowed the plaintiff's claim in so far as it relates to the Brat plot on the ground that the suit was premature. He passed a decree in respect of the second and third plots. We confirmed the judgment of the lower Court in its entirety. The defendants desire to prefer an appeal to the Privy Council. So far as Kadapetham is concerned, it was not even argued for the defence that the decision of the lower Court was wrong and, giving effect to a plea of res judicata we held that the defendants were bound to deliver up possession of that plot. Then remains the only other item, Baker Gidangadi, which alone can form the subject-matter of. appeal to the Privy Council. It is admitted that its value is far below Es. 10,000, The first paragraph of Section 110 has, therefore, clearly no application.

(3.) Then comes the question can the petitioners rely upon the second paragraph? It refers to cases where the decree involves directly or indirectly some claim or question to or respecting property of the requisite value. To what kind of cases this paragraph applies, is indicated in the following passage, in the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Radhakrishna Ayyar v. Sundaraswamier 74 Ind. Cas. 584 : 45 M. 475 at p. 481 : 36 C.L.J. 450 : 16 L.W. 18 : 31 M.L.T. 31 : 43 M.L.J. 323 : 27 C.W.N. 1 : A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 257 : 20 A.L.J. 937 : 49 I.A. 211 (P.C.). In the first place, the sum of money actually at stake may not represent the true value. The proceeding may, in many cases, such as a suit for an instalment of rent or under a contract, raise the entire question of the contract relations between the parties and that question may, settled one way or the other, affect a much greater value, and its determination may govern rights and liabilities of a value beyond the limit Banarsi Prasad V/s. Kashi Krishna Narain 28 I.A. 11 : 23 A. 227 : 8 Sar. P.C.J. 447 : 11 M.L.J. 56 : 3 Bom. L.R. 134 : 5 C.W.N. 193 : 7 Sar. P.C.J. 825 (P.C.). The Courts below may accordingly with propriety, as was done in this case, make the necessary certificate.