BHOLA NATH Vs. RAGHUNATH DAS MITHAN LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application in revision from an order superseding a reference to arbitration before the award was delivered. Defendants 1 and 2 applied to the Court that the reference should be superseded on the ground that the umpire was related to the plaintiff and that the uncle of the umpire's son-in-law had sued the defendants at Kasganj and the plaintiff had an apprehension that the fact might influence the mind of the umpire in deciding the case. The learned Munsif after taking evidence came to the conclusion that it was not proved that the umpire was in any way related to the plaintiff but considered that defendants 1 and 2 might very well apprehend that the umpire would not treat them fairly. He himself did not record any finding that in his own opinion there was an apprehension that justice would not be done and that his immediate intervention was called for. He superseded the reference and fixed a date for the disposal of the suit. Defendant 3 has applied in revision from this order and has impleaded the other parties as respondents.

(2.) A preliminary objection is taken on behalf of defendants 1 and 2 that no revision lies and reliance is placed on the Full Bench case of Buddhu Lal V/s. Mewa Ram A.I.R. 1921 All. 1. In our opinion this objection is not well founded. In the Full Bench case the trial Court had recorded its finding on one of the issues relating to the question of jurisdiction. The learned Judges thought that the word case in Section 115 was wide enough to include any particular question in issue between the parties to the suit, but two other learned Judges took the view that the expression "case decided" meant suit decided" and that no revision could lie from an interlocutory order. The fifth Judge, viz., Ryves, J. confined his judgment to the question whether the decision on a single issue by a Subordinate Court while the suit was still pending in that Court was a case decided within the meaning of Section 115, and came to the conclusion that it was not. It therefore seems to us that the Full Bench case is an authority only for the proposition that no revision lies from a finding recorded by the trial Court on one or more issues out of several that are before it for disposal. There was no majority in favour of the broad proposition that no revision lies from an interlocutory order. We may note that a revision from an order restoring a case has been held by another Full Bench to be open to revision, Ram Sarup V/s. Gaya Prasad .

(3.) It seems to us that the word "case" does not necessarily mean "suit" but can mean a proceeding. If any proceeding in a suit has terminated it is certainly a case decided within the meaning of Section 115, although the suit itself has not been finally disposed of. In the present case there was a reference to arbitration then there was an application for supersession which has been finally disposed of and the reference has come to an end. That proceeding has terminated and the case is now restored on its original number and is ordered to be disposed of by the Court. The order superseding the reference to arbitration in our opinion, amounts to an order deciding a case and as no appeal lies from it, it is open to revision. This was the view taken by a Bench of this Court in the case of Chaturbhuj V/s. Raghubar Dayal [1911] 36 All. 354, in which the revision from an order superseding an arbitration was actually entertained and allowed. We therefore think that there is no force in the preliminary objection.