(1.) FINDLAY , J.C. 1. I have heard the pleader for the appellant in this case but it seems to me that the present appeal is clearly barred under para. 21, Schedule 2, Civil P.C. Sub-para. 2 thereof only allows an appeal in a case like the present where the decree is in excess of and is not in accordance with the award. The applicant's case in attempting to attack the preliminary decree is that it was obtained by fraud. That is obviously not a ground which can be considered under the rule in question; clearly, the appellant's remedy is by a separate suit. To attempt to invoke Section 151, Civil P.C. is an equally futile suggestion. I am in full agreement with the decision of Hallifax, A.J.C. in Sadasheo Rao v. Umaji A.I.R. 1927 Nag. 212, in that connexion.
(2.) IT has been suggested that, in any event, the appeal might be treated as an application for revision. There is no prima facie reason, either technically or on merits, for allowing this to be done and I am wholly unable to see any ground for allowing the appeal to go further. It is clearly barred for the reasons stated above and, if the appellant has any remedy, it is by a separate suit.