SWAMINATHAN ALIAS CHIDAMBARAM PILLAI Vs. LAKSHMANAN CHETTIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question we have to decide is, what is the meaning of the expression "making of the order " in Secs.73 and 77 of the Indian Registration Act? The plaintiff on 28 September, 1926, presented to the Sub-Registrar for registration, Ex. A. the sale-deed executed in his favour by the 1 defendant. The latter, in spite of notices served upon him, failed to appear before the Officer in question and, on the 16 of October, the plaintiff filed a statement requesting the Sub-Registrar to make an order refusing registration. After making an order to that effect on the 18 of October, the Sub-Registrar sent a post card Ex. B, to the plaintiff, informing him of the order and it reached him on the 19 of October. The plaintiff on the 18th of November applied to the Registrar under Section T3 to establish his right to have the document registered. That section enacts that the application should be made within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal by the Sub-Registrar. If the terminus a quo is the date when the order was communicated to the plaintiff, the application is in time; but if the thirty days should be computed from the date of the order, the application is a day too late.

(2.) The District Registrar rejected the application on the ground that it was barred by time. He made his order on the 16 of December and forwarded it to the plaintiff on the 20 and it reached him on the 23rd. The plaintiff filed the suit from which the present appeal arises on the 19 of January 1927. Section 77 enacts that the party desiring to impeach the order of the Registrar should file a suit within thirty days after the making of an order of refusal. If the starting point is the date of the District Registrar's order, the suit is out of time by four days; if it is the date when the order reached the plaintiff, the suit is well within time. The District Munsif dismissed the suit holding that it is time-barred. The lower Appellate Court took the opposite view and remanded the suit for further trial.

(3.) I shall now notice briefly the various sections that have a bearing on the point to be considered. Section 35 provides that if any person by whom the document purports to be executed denies its execution, the Sub-Registrar shall refuse to register the document. It is conceded that failure of the executant to appear amounts to a denial of execution by him. [See Sivarama Pattar Karikar V/s. Krishna Iyer 23 Ind. Cas. 23 : 26 M.L.J. 307 : 15 M.L.T. 233 and Chhotey Lal V/s. Collector of Moradabad 69 Ind Cas. 44 : 44 A. 514 at p. 517 : A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 279 : 31 M.L.T. 284 : 27 C.W.N. 437 : 21 A.L.J. 361 : 37 C.L.J. 377 : 9 O. & A.L.R. 450 : 25 Bom. L.R. 655 : 18 L.W. 124 : (1923) M.W.N. 873 : 49 I.A. 375 (P.C.).]