CHUNG CHUCK Vs. REX

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are consolidated appeals from a judgment of the Court of Appeal of British Columbia, and they arise out of the prosecutions instituted against the appellants for offences against the Produce Marketing Act (Statutes of British Columbia, 1926-27. Chap. 54), as amended by the Produce Marketing Act Amendment Act (Statutes of British Columbia, 1928, Chap. 39), and certain regulations and orders made thereunder.

(2.) The appeals are brought in pursuance of leave granted to the appellants by the Court of Appeal of British Columbia. Though the proceedings in the Courts below were somewhat different in form, both appeals raise the same point for decision here. The appellant in the first appeal, Chung Chuck, who resided and grew potatoes within the area in question in 1928, was charged on 8 August 1928, with unlawfully marketing potatoes on 29 June 1928, within British Columbia without the written permission of the Mainland Potato Committee, and was convicted and fined $ 10, and in default of payment, one month's imprisonment. The appellant applied by way of habeas corpus and writ of certiorari for his discharge from custody, alleging that the said Produce Marketing Act was ultra vires of the legislature of the Province of British Columbia, for certain reasons which for the moment need not be set forth. On 27 August 1918, Murphy, J., dismissed the appellant's application, holding that the statute in question did not infringe upon the powers of the Dominion Parliament under heads (2) and (27), S. 91, British North America Act; nor upon S. 498, Criminal Code, Revised Statutes of Canada 1927, Chap. 36, and further holding that if the statute did infringe upon S. 498 this section was ultra vires of the Dominion Parliament. It is unnecessary to discuss in detail the circumstances giving rise to the second appeal. The appeals-which have been consolidated-raise the same point.

(3.) The appellant, Chung Chuck, appealed to the Court of Appeal, and on 8 January 1929, the appeal was unanimously dismissed. In Wonq Kit's case, the appellant's acquittal by the Police Magistrate having been upheld by the Supreme Court, the Crown was the appellant in the Court of Appeal, and that appeal was allowed.