MOHAMMAD KHAN Vs. MT. FATMA BAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) MACNAIR , Offg. J.C. 1. Mohammad Khan filed an. appeal in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Nagpur: this appeal was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by time and that the appellant was not entitled to any extension of the period of limitation under Section 5, Limitation Act. In second appeal it is urged that the appeal was not time barred. Mohammad Khan applied for a copy of the judgment and decree of the first Court on 11th August 1928 and was told to appear on 18th August 1928. On 13th August 1928 it was found that the information given in the application was wrong: no steps for the preparation of the copy were taken until 18th August 1928 when the appellant appeared and furnished the required information.1 What is urged before is that the interval, 11th August 1928 to 18th August 1928, or at least the interval 13th August 1928 to 18bh August 1928 should be held part of the time requisite for obtaining the copy.

(2.) IT is the practice of this Court that copying time begins to run from the date on which correct information is supplied. This has been so held in Ashroba v. Bajirao Second Appeal No.227 of 1929 and in Madhorao v. Collector Misc. Judicial Case No. 25 of 1928 decided on 17th April 1929. If an opposite view were held, it would be possible for the appellant to delay filing an appeal by putting in application for copies, compliance with which was not possible.

(3.) I have next to consider whether the appeal should be admitted after the period of limitation on the ground that any act of the copying-department prevented the appellant from filing the appeal within time. It was not the duty of the copying department, when on 13th August'1928 the application was found to be incorrect, to give any notice to the applicant who was expected to-appear within a few days. The failure of the applicant to furnish correct information in his application then had the natural result that copying time did not commence till 18th August 1928. Again had the copying staff acted improperly it would still be necessary for the appellant to show that their action prevented the filing of an appeal in time. The applicant received the copy in ample time to enable him to appeal: probably he was careless and thought that the time for copying would be allowed from the day on which he first presented his application. It is admitted that if the time for copying began to run from 18th August 1928 the appeal is barred by time. I hold therefore that the appeal was rightly dismissed. The second appeal is therefore dismissed.