SEGU ROWTHEN Vs. MUTHU KRVALAGAPPA CHETTY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a suit for rent. The claim is in respect of 2 faslis before the Madras Estates Land Act 1908, came into operation, and one after. The question is, is the defendant liable to pay rent in respect of the entire area of his holding or is he only liable to pay rent in respect of so much of his holding as was in fact cultivated during the period for which rent is claimed by the plaintiffs. The patta which is in evidence bears date the 30th June 1907 a date prior to the coming into operation of the Madras Estates Land Act. It is not clear whether there has been any formal acceptance of the patta by the defendant--it is not suggested by him there has not been, and the plaintiff s case is that the patta has been accepted. The plaintiffs do not suggest that the patta is not binding on them. In paragraph 2 of the patta we have a provision that for the lands whether cultivated or left waste by the defendant s default, rent at a certain rate has to be paid. That standing alone clearly suggests that rent is only payable on lands in fact cultivated or on lands which might in fact have been cultivated but were left uncultivated by reason of the defendant s neglect. We have a later provision in the patta, Clause 6, that if the defendant finds it impossible to cultivate or does not want any portion of the lands comprised in his holding he should apply for relinquishment, I shall have to refer to that in a moment all that is necessary to say now is that so for as that particular provision in the patta goes it does help the plaintiffs contention. Now the issue and the only issue with regard to the question and it is an issue of fact--is this. " Is the whole lands comprised in the account cultivable and is waste due to the neglect of the ryots." The issue seems to have been framed on the assumption that the defendant was only liable to pay the rent in respect of land which was cultivable, and which was not cultivated by reason of the neglect of the defendant. According to the form of the issue-- and it has not been suggested the issue is wrong--the plaintiff had to prove two things, first that the land in respect of which he claims rent was cultivable, secondly, that it was on account of the neglect of the defendant that cultivable land had not been cultivated. That this was the plaintiff s case--at any rate in the Court of first instance, is clear from the opening words of the judgment of the Deputy Collector: "the plaintiff s allege that the defendants have left the lands to lie waste and this was due to their neglect, and that rent is consequently payable for the same." There is no finding that the lands were allowed to remain uncultivated by reason of the neglect of the defendants. Inferentially the findings are all the other way. The findings of the District Judge are: "The lower Court found that the lands are peculiarly unproductive and that the same field cannot be cultivated every year and I see no reason to disagree." Again, " there is also no doubt that until fasli 1316 the custom Was to charge only for the areas actually cultivated each year. " Now, what have we to guide us to what was really meant when this patta was accepted ? First, we have the admitted fact that up to the granting of this patta the plaintiffs only charged for the areas actually cultivated. Unless there was some indication to the contrary there is a presumption that the parties intended that their respective obligations should continue to be the same. That that was the intention as it seems to me, is borne out by the provision in the patta itself contained in cause (2) to which I have already referred. It seems clear that in the Court of first instance no reliance was placed upon the provisions of the Estates Land Act. In the District Court an attempt was made to set up a case under the act which had been passed subsequently to the granting of the patta which is in evidence. The plaintiffs relied upon Section 4 and the definition of " rent " contained in Section 3 Sub-section 11. Section 4 says that the landlord is entitled to collect rent in respect of all ryoti land in the occupation of a ryot. Prima facie it is so, but if the evidence shows that it was not the intention of the parties that he should collect rent in respect of all land in occupation of the ryot but should collect rent only in respect of the land in fact cultivated by the ryot, of course the intention of the parties overrides the provision of the act. This section of the Act merely lays down the general rule, in my opinion, can be displaced by evidence as to what the parties meant and intended.

(2.) As regards Clause 6 of the patta, that no doubt supports the plaintiff s contention. We were referred to a case reported in Vedantachariar v. Iyyasami Mudali (1881) I.L.R. 4 M. 322 where a provision similar to this was objected to, The Court took the view that such a provision was unreasonable and they went on to observe the removal of the clause would not, of course affect the landlord s right to collect the whole rent notwithstanding that lands are left uncultivated."

(3.) In that case the report does not state all the terms of the patta Here, reading the patta as a whole, the intention of the parties seems reasonably clear. I think the conclusion arrived at by the Deputy Collector is right, and that the decree of the lower Court should be set aside and that of the Deputy Collector restored with costs here and in the Court below.