RANGASAMI CHETTI Vs. THANGAVELU CHETTI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I have had the advantage of reading the judgment, which my learned brother is about to deliver, and, as I agree with his conclusion, I deal only with the one important question we have to decide, whether the appellant is entitled to the extension of time he claims, as transferee from a minor. It does not appear material that his transfer was not voluntary, but was effected by attachment followed by a sale of the debt and an order vesting it in him as purchaser; and I assume that time did not begin to run, before the minor s acquisition of the cause of action. Appellant s contention is that he is entitled to the full extension of time, which the minor would have had, if the cause of action had remained his property or, in the alternative, to three years from the date, when his own ownership began.

(2.) This alternative contention can be dealt with shortly. It cannot be justified by any provision of the Limitation Act; for Section 6(3) is, as will be shown, the only one extending time for a person other than the one disabled and it is inapplicable to appellant, a transferee during the latter s lifetime. In fact, the argument in this form must rest solely on the tentative reasoning of Wilson, J., in Rudra Kant Surma Sircar v. Nobo Kishore Surma Biswas 9 C. 663 : 12 C.L.R. 269 : 4 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 1091, that an alienation of the cause of action terminates the existing disability and on general principles carries with it the right to sue thereon, which the alienor on such termination would acquire. But with all due deference, although on general principles the transferor s right to sue may pass with the cause of action, that goes no way towards answering the question whether it does so, when the operation of those principles has been interrupted by the special law, with which we are dealing, and special consideration? have been introduced; and it is still necessary to meet the argument of the majority of the Court that the disabled person s right to an extension is personal and does not necessarily remain alive after an alienation by him.

(3.) Turning to appellant s argument in its wider form, I need not repeat my learned brother s references to the cases. For, although the actual current of authority, whatever its tendency here and in Bombay, is in respondent s favour, it is not strong enough to conclude the question. To turn then to the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act, their wording does not authorize appellant s contention and their intention, so far as it can be deduced, is against it.