(1.) I agree unreservedly with the conclusion of my learned brother in the judgment, which he is about to deliver, that a person claiming, like the plaintiff, the appellant, separate maintenance must show some good cause for doing so and that a claim to menchilavn is on the same footing as a claim to maintenance.
(2.) The more difficult question is whether the plaintiff s desire to live with his wife (for that is the real justification which he can allege for his claim) is such good cause; and I have felt great doubt whether the reasoning by which corresponding claims by female members have been countenanced in Marudevi v. Pammaka (1911) I.L.R. 36 M. 203 Kunchi v. Ammu (1912) I.L.R. 36 M. 691 and Muthn Amma v. Gopalan (1912) I.L.R. 36 M. 593 should be extended. For those decisions involve, with all due difference, a radical departure from the view taken by earlier authorities. They have, however, been acquiesced in, so far as we have been shown, for over five years; they proceeded from learned Judges, whose competence in West Coast law commands respect; and their departure from or extension of recognised principles was deliberate. In these circumstances it seems to me that the principle as regards females must be treated as established; and if it is so, there is no reason against applying it for the benefit also of male members, since it has not been shown how any special consideration such as the right of the tarwad to any services at their hands or otherwise to their presence in it, as a condition of their right to maintenance, can be sustained against them.
(3.) I concur in allowing the appeal, reversing the decree of the District Judge and restoring that of the District Munsif. Each party will bear their own costs throughout. Seshagiri Aiyar, J.