DAMODAR KRISHNA KULKARNI Vs. COLLECTOR OF NASIK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This suit was filed by the plaintiffs alleging that they were the hereditary Kulkarni Vatandars, plaintiff No. 1 holding eight annas share and plaintiff No. 2 holding two annas eight pies share in the villages of Pimpalgaon, Baswant, of the Nasik District; that the Vahivat of the said Vatan had been carried on in their family hereditarily for a long time since the time of their ancestors; hence the plaintiffs had the right of carrying on the Vahivat; but notwithstanding this the Revenue Officers of the defendant, without taking into consideration plaintiffs legal rights, and after using undue influence and coercion had compelled the plaintiffs to give consent to a commutation of their Vatans against the plaintiffs will; that according to the provisions of the Vatan Act no such transaction could take place; any such act, if done, was illegal, and, therefore, the plaintiffs were not bound by the said consent, nor were their rights affected thereby. The plaintiffs prayed that they be declared hereditary Vatandar Kulkarnis of the villages) of Pimpalgaon, Baswant and Dehed, and that it might be declared that the plaintiffs were entitled to be Vatandars and entitled to the Vahivat of the said Vatan hereditarily as before; and for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the Vahivat and enjoyment of the Vatan by the plaintiffs.

(2.) Notice had been given under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code to the defendant. The period of the notice expired on the 30th September 1917. Therefore the cause of action arose on the 30th September 1917 when the period of notice expired.

(3.) The plaint was rejected by the District Judge on the ground that the suit was barred under Section 4 (a) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act of 1876 and on reading the prayers of the plaint, it would be perfectly clear that the suit did come within Section 4 (a) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act. But it has been represented to us in first appeal that the plaintiffs were really claiming that the arrangement between them and the Revenue Officers should be set aside on the ground of undue influence and coercion. It was pointed out to the appellants counsel that there was no prayer in the plaint asking to set aside the agreement, and so long as the agreement stood, it would be impossible for the plaintiffs to obtain the declaration they ask for in paras (a) and (b) of the prayers. It would not be possible to amend the plaint, because the plaint must correspond to the notice given under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, the object of that notice being that the Secretary of State may have knowledge of the claim made against him.