ADIVEPPA NAGAPPA ARSINGADI Vs. TOUTAPPA TIPPANNA RANGANWAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiff sued to recover possession of the plaint property with past mesne profits for the year 1914-15, with future mesne profits and costs from the defendants. The land in suit belonged originally to one Shiddawa who had a life estate. On the 3rd of August 1911 she made a gift of her property to her daughter Laxmava. Laxmava died on the 29th January 1914, leaving a daughter who died on the 31st January 1914) leaving her husband, the plaintiff in this case, her surviving. The 1st defendant is the husband of Laxmava and defendants 2 and 3 are his sons. The plaintiff s case is that Shiddawa s gift to his wife and her daughter Laxmava operated as a valid acceleration of Laxmava s interest as the nearest reversioner at the time, and that, therefore, the property went to Laxmava s daughter and from the daughter to the plaintiff, even if that daughter was married.

(2.) The trial Court dismissed the plaintiff s claim. It found on the 3rd issue, whether the gift to Laxmava by Shiddava was an acceleration of Shiddava s estate, in the negative. The learned Judge said: "In the end the donor makes it a condition precedent for her maintenance till death to the said bequest. The learned pleader for the plaintiff concedes (sic) that the disposition can be a valid gift under Hindu law. The only point then is whether it amounts to an acceleration of Shiddava s estate. The simple test to be applied in the present case is whether the donor could or could not maintain successfully an action on the deed of gift in case she were not maintained by the donee. I hold that she could. It, therefore, follows that Shiddava by no means disposed of her entire life estate by the execution of the deed."

(3.) The decree dismissing the plaintiff s claim was set aside by the lower appellate Court which held that the acceleration under the gift of Shiddava to Laxmava was valid. The learned Judge seemed to consider that the widow who gave away her life estate in favour of the nearest reversioner, with a condition attached that the donee should maintain her, could succeed in a suit for maintenance even although the acceleration were upheld. I do not think that this argument is sound. In order that an acceleration by a Hindu widow of her life estate should be valid, it was laid down in Behari Lal v. Madho Lal Ahir Gyawal (1896) L.R. 19 I.A. 30, 32 that it was essentially necessary that the widow should withdraw her own life-estate, so that the whole estate should get vested at once in the grantee. The necessity of the removal of the obstacle of the life-estate was a practical cheek on the frequency of such conveyances. In Moti Baiji v. Laldaa Jebhai (1916) I.L.R. 41 Bom. 93 : 18 Bom. L.R. 954, 972 Mr. Justice Beaman explained the difference between an alienation by a. widow, and acceleration by her which had the effect of putting an end to her life estate and vesting the estate in the nearest reversioner. In that case it was arranged that one-third of the property should come back to the widow and on that ground it was held that the acceleration was invalid. Mr. Justice Heaton in his judgment cited the case which I have just referred to, viz., Behari Lal v. Madho Lal Ahir Gyawal (1896) L.R. 19 I.A. 30. He went on to say: "That clearly brings out the idea that for an acceleration there must be an absolute annihilation of the widow s interest, as complete as if she were dead."