NEMANNAKUDRE Vs. LCHMU HENGASU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The first point argued in this Second Appeal has not been taken in the appellant s grounds of appeal, but as it involves a question of principle; and as it strikes at the root of the jurisdiction of the Courts if the appellant succeeds on it, we have allowed it to be argued.

(2.) I agree with my learned brother that what the Courts were asked to do in this suit was not to frame a scheme or to exercise any undefined authority of selecting the most suitable person to manage the affairs of this family, but to remove the present ejaman for mismanagement and at the same time to declare that the next in order of seniority was unfit to hold the vacant office, and I fail to see any reason for supposing that Civil Courts have no power to grant such a declaration.

(3.) Speaking for myself, I am averse to putting any narrow limitations on the power of Courts to do all that is needful to settle the disputes of the parties in all civil matters that come up to be adjudicated upon. To hold otherwise would be to deprive these tribunals of authority to make a final settlement of opposing contentions. In Chindan Nambiar v. Kunhi Raman Nambiar (1918) I.L.R. 41 M. 577 : 34 M.L.J. 400 the full Bench had no doubt about the civil Court s power to remove from the Karnavanship for misfeasance a person who had attained that position by a course different from the ordinary course, namely, by a family agreement.