VEERAPPA CHETTY Vs. RAMASWAMY CHETTY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts of the case are not in dispute. The 2nd defendant obtained a decree against the 1st defendant in the Temporary Suborinate Judge s Court at Ramnad on the 8th of April 1913. It was transferred for execution to the permanent Sub- Court and an application for attachment was made to that Court on the 18th of April 1913. On the 21st April 1913 the taluk in which the property sought to be attached was situate, was transferred from the jurisdiction of the Eamnad Sub- Court to that of the Sivaganga Sub-Court. Even after this transfer, the Ramnad Court issued an order of attachment on the 25th of June 1913. The property was sold on the 10th November 1913 and the 2nd defendant became the purchaser. The sale was confirmed on the 11th of December 1913. The judgment-debtor, the 1st defendant, did not object to the confirmation.

(2.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, instituted a suit against the 1st defendant in the Sub-Court at Sivaganga and obtained a decree in December 1912. He attached the same properties on the 17th September 1913. The sale was on the 30th June 1914 and the plaintiff became the purchaser.

(3.) The present suit is for possession, The Subordinate Judge has given a decree to the plaintiff. The 2nd defendant has appealed. Three main contentions were put forward by Mr. A. Krislinaswamier. It was first contended that by the transfer of territorial jurisdiction, the Ramnad Court does not cease to have jurisdiction, as at the time of application for attachment it had jurisdiction. The recent Full Bench ruling in Seeni Nadan alias Virakumara Nadan v. Muthuswami Pillai that an application to the court which passed the decree would be one in accordance with law does not affect the present case. The permanent Sub-Court of Ramnad which executed the decree was not the Court which passed the decree. Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar referred to the analogy of cases in which it was held that the conferring of appellate jurisdiction on a new Court would not deprive the suitor to whom the right of preferring appeal had accrued already from filing the appeal in the old appellate tribunal. vide Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving (1905) A.C. 369. Reference was also made to Subbaraya Mudaliar v. Rakki (1908) I.L.R. 32 M. 140 and Ramakrishna Chetty v. Subbaraya Aiyar (1912) I.L.R. 38 M. 101 in which it was held that pending suits are not transferred ipso facto by the vesting of jurisdiction in another Court. I do not think the analogy holds good. The essence of the notification is the deprivation of jurisdiction of one court and the conferring of it on another. Therefore this notification must be read as speaking retrospectively and as declaring that from and after its date, the first Court ceased to have jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Moreover the language of Clause (b) of Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure to which the learned Vakil for the respondent drew our attention shows that the legislature conferred the power of dealing with immoveable property only to the Court which had territorial jurisdiction over it. This was the view taken in Subbiah Naicker v. Ramanathan Chettiar (1914) I.L.R. 37 M. 462 and the cases following it. Viswanathan Chetty v. Murugappa Chetty is an express decision on the point. This view was not dissented from by the learned Chief Justice in the recent Full Bench judgment in Seeni Nadan alias Virakumara Nadan. v. Muthusami Pillai and the other two learned Judges have expressly re-affirmed this view. I am not satisfied that it was wrong, I am therefore of opinion that the Ramnad Court had no jurisdiction to attach or sell the property on the dates on which it exercised those powers.