LAWS(PVC)-1919-4-8

DEPUTY COLLECTOR OF MADURA Vs. RAMASAMI PILLAI

Decided On April 28, 1919
DEPUTY COLLECTOR OF MADURA Appellant
V/S
RAMASAMI PILLAI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from an award of the District Judge of Madura in certain land acquisition proceedings and the preliminary question is whether Article 156 of the Limitation Act applies. The court-fees were paid on the memorandum of appeal 1 year and 149 days out of time, and if Article 156 applies the appeal would be barred. The question is of first impression and cannot be said to be quite free from difficulty. The Land Acquisition Act gives a right of appeal by Section 54, which lays down: Subject to the provisions of the Coda of Civil Procedure applicable to appeals from original decrees, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from the award or from any part of the award of the Court in any proceedings under this Act.

(2.) There is no special period of limitation provided for in the Land Acquisition Act, nor is there any allusion, unless it be by implication of this very section, to the Limitation Act. Article 156 of the Limitation Act provides a period of 90 days for "appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to a High Court, except in the cases provided for by Article 151 and Article 153," the time to run from "the date of decree or order appealed from." The argument on behalf of the appellant is that you must; read the first column of the article.) as meaning that the appeals provided for here are those the tight to which is conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure, and it is contended that this interpretation is strengthened by the language of column 3. There is no direct authority on the point. There is however a ruling of the Calcutta High Court, Aga Muhammad Hamadani v. Cohen (l886) I.L.R., 13 Calc., 221 the reasoning of the decision in which seems to apply to the present question. There the objection was raised with reference to an appeal provided for under the Burma Courts Act, XVII of 1875. Section 49 of that Act provided for an appeal to the High Court of Calcutta in cases where the amount of value of the subject-matter exceeded Rs. 3,000 and was less than Rs. 10,000. Wilson and Porter, JJ., interpreted the words "Appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure" in Article 156 of the Limitation Act as meaning appeals, the procedure in respect of which is governed by the Civil Procedure Code. They say: The Limitation Act, schedule II, Article 156, when it speaks of the Civil Procedure Code, is, on the face of it, speaking of a Code which relates to procedure, and does not ordinarily deal with substantive rights and the natural meaning of an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code appears to us to be an appeal governed by the Code of Civil Procedure so far as procedure is concerned.

(3.) It seems to us that this is the correct interpretation of Article 156. There seems to be no good reason for saying that an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code means only an appeal the right to prefer which is conferred by the Code itself. On the other hand it would not be straining the language of the article too much to hold that an appeal, the procedure with respect to which, from its inception to its disposal, is governed by the Civil Procedure Code, may rightly be spoken of an an appeal under the Code; this interpretation seems to us to be strengthened by the reference in Article 156 itself to Article 151 of the same schedule. Article 151 provides for appeals from a decree or order of the High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Now though the right to appeal from such decrees or orders is not given by the Code of Civil Procedure but by the Letters Patent Appeal yet Article 156 speaks of such appeals as appeals under the Civil Procedure Code. That also tends to show that what is meant by the legislature is appeals, the hearing and disposal of which is governed by the rules of procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code.