JAGDAMI PERSHAD SINGH Vs. MAHADEO KANDOO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This was a rule on the District Magistrate of Mozaffarpur and also on the opposite Party to show cause why an order under Section 250 of the Criminal P. C. should not be set aside, firstly, on the ground that the petitioner was not the person upon whose complaint or information the accusation was made and, secondly, on the ground that the petitioner being a servant was not responsible for the information given on behalf of his master.

(2.) Having regard to the first point, the learned pleader for the petitioner has asked us to draw a distinction between the informations referred to in Section 151 of the Code and those referred to in Section 157. He contends that the words in Section 250 "upon information given to a police-officer" refer only to information given in Section 154 and resulting in a Police investigation and final report under Section 173. He contends further that the information referred to in Section 157 is different to, and does not include, information given under Section 154. We do not think, however, that this distinction exists. We think that the words "from information received" in Section 157 refer to the information given in Section 154. It appears to us that the information in this case was lodged under Section 154, was reported to the Magistrate under Section 157, and was finally reported under Section 173. We find here that the case was instituted ultimately upon a police report but originally upon information given to a police-officer, within the meaning of Section 250.

(3.) It remains to be seen whether the petitioner is responsible for the accusation against these three persons Aklu, Mahadeo and Ramphal. Now, as regards Aklu, all that the petitioner did was to lay information on behalf of his master and to say that Aklu was suspected. The learned Vakil for shown us a note of a (sic.) Pui servant cannot be held res (sic) 250 for an information of his master. It appears to (sic) whether a servant is responsible in such a case is one of fact depends on the question whether the servant is merely the mouthpiece of the master and is merely giving expressions to his master's accusation, or, whether he joins personally in the accusation himself. Here, there is nothing in the judgments below to indicate that the petitioner was anything more than the mouthpiece of his master so far as Aklu is concerned, and we think that he cannot be made liable to compensate Aklu.