GOBIND CHANDRA DAS Vs. RADHA KRISTO DAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant in this appeal is one Gobind Chandra Das. In the plaint he states that he and the defendants are members of a joint Hindu family of which Radha Kristo Das the eldest brother is the head and managing member. Gobind Chandra Das and Radha Kristo Das are brothers; the remaining defendants are the sons of Radha Kristo Das. He states that the immovable property scheduled in the plaint had been purchased by the defendant No. 1 with family funds left by the ancestors, that the parties are in joint possession and he asks that he might be put in possession of a half share of the property, In addition he also sets out in the schedule attached to the plaint a great quantity of movable property, cash, ornaments, bonds and other household articles, all of which according to him are in the joint possession of the members of the joint family and he asks to be put in possession of a half share of the movable property also. The defendants put in a joint defence in which they state that they are not members of a joint Hindu family, that there is no joint property and that the properties claimed are all the self-acquired property of the defendant Radha Kristo Das. The Court below found that the plaintiff had not proved that the properties in dispute were the joint ancestral properties of the family or that they had been acquired by the plaintiff and Radha Kristo Das jointly. It also found that there was no proof that there was originally any joint stock of the family or that Radha Kristo Das threw his own earnings and savings into the joint stock. On the contrary it found that the properties in dispute were the self-acquired properties of Radha Kristo Das and dismissed the suit. These findings are attacked in appeal here. Out of the six pleas contained in the memorandum of appeal, the 2nd and 6 were not argued. It was now contended that the lower Court had erred in law in holding that the burden of proof lay on the plaintiff; secondly, that the documentary evidence on the record showed beyond doubt that the properties in dispute were the joint properties of the parties; thirdly, that the evidence established that there was a nucleus of ancestral property, and lastly that Radha Kristo Das had utterly failed to show that the properties in dispute were his separate acquisition. The learned Vakil who appeared for the appellant did not make any reference to the particular school of law under which the family lived. Ho argued as though the case before us was a case in which we had to apply the law contained in the Mitakshara, but this was at once challenged by the learned advocate for the respondents. He maintained that as the family admittedly came from Lower Bengal and the father of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 had emigrated from Murshidabad, somewhere in the late forties and had settled first at Bindraban, then at Agra and last at Allahabad, it must be held, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the family, which was originally governed by the Dayabhaga School of Law, had carried their personal law with them and were still bound by it. He referred us to the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Surendra Nath Roy v. Musammat Hiramani Barmani 12 M.I.A. 81 : 1 B.L.R. (P.C.) 26 : 10 W.R. 35 (P.C.) in which their Lordships observe that as orientals are commonly tenacious of their usages, and customs, and more especially of their family and religious observances, therefore, on the ordinary principles of viewing evidence, a continuance of this state of things is presumable and the onus would then lie on the party alleging an interruption or cessation of it to prove such allegation." The case quoted is, undoubtedly, a strong one because there was evidence on that record showing that the family which was originally a family governed by the Mitakshara law had migrated to Lower Bengal attended by priests of their own persuasion, but this is not the only case to be found. There is the case Ram Bromo Pandahv Kaminee Soondury Dossee 6 W.R. 295. One of the learned Judges, who decided that case, was Mr. Justice Shambhu Nath Pandit an eminent authority on Hindu law. The learned Judges held that it was to be presumed that a Hindu family migrating to Bengal from the North Western Provinces or vice versa imports its own customs and law as regulating the succession and ceremonies in the family. A more recent case is the case of Parbati Kumari Debi V/s. Jagadis Chander Dhabal 29 C. 433 : 29 I.A. 82. In this case the family had migrated from these provinces and had settled down in the jungle mahal of Midnapore. Their Lordships of the Privy Council again alluding to the tenacity with which customs in Hindu families live even under the strain of migration, and that they had been repeatedly recognised continue. The presumption, therefore, is that the family continued to observe the Mitakshara and it remains to see whether the contrary has been proved."

(2.) On behalf of the appellant we were referred to the case of Ram Das v. Chandra Dassia 20 C. 409 as an authority for holding that members of the Hindu religion are governed by the school of law in force in the locality where they reside, but we do not think that the case helps the appellant. In the case cited, the parties were admittedly Rajhawsis and not Hindus originally. There was nothing to show, in the first instance, that they were governed by any particular school of law. Both the Courts found that the evidence as to the particular system they had adopted was too vague and unsatisfactory to be acted upon, and in the absence of trustworthy evidence they held that the family was governed by the school of law which prevailed in the part of the country where they resided. Indeed, in that particular case, their Lordships were careful to add that if the family had been governed generally by Hindu Law, the case would have been different.

(3.) We, therefore, think that in this case we may safely start with the presumption that the family before us is one which even under the strain of migration had retained the customs of law and of the Dayabhaga School.