NARENDRA NATH BAIRAGI Vs. DINA NATH DAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) On 5 January 1907, the respondent, Dina Nath Das, obtained letters of administration to the estate and effects of one Ramani Debi, widow of Chintamani Bairagi. On 6 March 1907, the appellant Narendra Nath Bairagi applied to the District Judge of the 24-Parganas for revocation of the letters of administration on the ground that the said Ramani Debi was a prostitute, and that he was her adopted son and heir, and so entitled to administer her estate in preference to Dina Nath Das, who claimed to be her husband's brother's son. The appellant further objected that he should have, but had not been, cited at the time the letters of administration were granted to Dina Nath Das. The District Judge has rejected the appellant's application on several grounds. He found that appellant's alleged adoption had not been proved; that it was not proved that Ramani Debi was a prostitute; that, even if proved, the kind of adoption set up by the appellant would give him no right of inheritance. He further found that appellant was aware of the application by Dina Nath Das for letters of administration.

(2.) Narendra Nath Bairagi has appealed. It is obvious that unless he can show that he was so adopted by the deceased as to give him a right of inheritance to her property he is in the position of a mere stranger, and has no locus standi in the administration proceedings. This point was argued before us by the counsel for the appellant. He maintained that Ramani Debi was a prostitute; that the adoption of daughters by women of her class is recognised in Madras and Western India; that it is only not recognised if Bengal because it is considered to be opposed to public policy; that no such consideration would underlie the adoption of a son by a woman of that class; and that, therefore, his client's adoption was a good adoption giving him all the rights of a natural-born son.

(3.) Assuming for the purposes of argument that Ramani Debi was a prostitute, no authority was cited to us either from texts, or text-books, or decided cases for the proposition that a Hindu woman can under any circumstances adopt a son to herself. On the other hand, the contrary is clearly stated: see Mayne's Hindu Law, page 263; Shastri, page 129. The learned Counsel admitted that he had no authority for this proposition, but asked us to decide in appellant's favour on "general principles." We have no intention, even if we had the power, of creating a new rule of Hindu Law for the appellant's benefit. It is manifest that Ramani Debi had (sic) power to adopt, if she did adopt, the appellant as a son (sic) herself, nor could any so-called adoption confer on him(sic) right of inheritance. It follows that he has no locus standi (sic) this case, and it is unnecessary to go into the other question(sic) mainly of fact, which are raised on this appeal. The appeal is dismissed with costs.