VATTAKULAKARAN SOWDAKER ABU BACKER SAHIB; BEMBLASSERYSANKUNNI MENON AND KRISHNA MENON Vs. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I am of opinion that the provision in Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1877, that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order appealed against should be excluded, does not apply to appeals under Section 10 of the Madras Forest Act, 1882.

(2.) I think this opinion might reasonably be based on the short ground that Section 10 of the Forest Act, which gives a right of appeal from the forest Settlement Officer to the District Court, in the case of certain claims to a right in or over land within 30 days from the date of the order appealed against, empowers the Governor in Council to extend the time for appeal. The application of the provision of Section 12 of the Limitation Act with reference) to the exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, as it seams to me, necessarily operates as an extension of the prescribed period of limitation. Section 10 of the Farest Act in express terms gives the power to extend the period to the Governor in Council. Notwithstanding that the provision as to the exclusion of time in Section 12 of the Limitation Act works automatically whilst the power of extension given to the Governor in Council is a discretionary power to be exercised on just and reasonable cause being shown, I should be disposed to hold that the express power to extend the time given to the Governor in Council shows that the legislature intended that the general provisions of the law requiring the Courts to extend the period of limitation in certain cases should have no application to appeals under Section 10 of the Act in question.

(3.) It may well be, as suggested in the order of reference, that section, 14 having provided a period of 60 days and Section 10 only a shorter period of 30 days, the power of extension for just and reasonable cause was inserted with a view to enable the Local Government to treat the appeal under Section 10 on the same footing as an appeal under Section 14.