(1.) The applicant in the case was the defendant in the Court below in a suit for possession under Section 9, Specific Belief Act. It has been found as a fact that the plaintiff was dispossessed by the defendant on 6 July 1944, without his consent and otherwise than in due course of law. On these findings the suit has been decreed by the Court below. Before the institution of the suit and after dispossession, which took place on 6 July 1944, proceedings under Section 145, Criminal P.C., were started on a police report. These proceedings terminated on 21 December 1944, when it was found by the criminal Court that the defendant was in possession on the date of the preliminary order under Section 146, Criminal P.C., and on that ground his possession over the property was to be maintained so long as he was not evicted therefrom by due process of law.
(2.) The contention of the learned Counsel before me is that the due process of law mentioned in Section 145, Criminal P.C., should be confined to a civil suit based upon title and does not include a proceeding under Section 9, Specific Belief Act. This contention was raised in the Court below but was not pressed and as such was abandoned. I am loath to entertain a revision on a ground which had been abandoned in the Court below.
(3.) Quite apart from this fact there seems to be no merit in the contention that has been put forward in this Court. A cause of action, entitling the plaintiff to institute a suit under Sec. 9, Specific Belief Act, arose on 6 July 1944, when he was dispossessed by the defendant. It is not possible to accept the contention that the plain-tiff was deprived of the right of seeking a remedy under Section 9, Specific Belief Act on account of the proceedings having been instituted under Section 145, Criminal P.C., before the limitation for instituting a suit under Section 9, Specific Belief Act had expired.