FAIYAZ HAIDER Vs. LRADHEY RAMAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of proceedings in execution of a decree for eviction.

(2.) The respondent is the owner of a house in the city of Lucknow which is occupied on rent by the appellants. There was default in payment of rent on 30th August 1944, and an erresrs decree for arrears as well as for ejectment was passed against the appellants. On 30 September. 1944, by reason of a compromise arrived at between the parties, the decree was modified and it was provided that the arrears then due would be paid in four equal monthly instalments and that in future the rent of Rs. 13-2-0 would be paid on the 15 of the following month. It seems that there were further defaults and execution proceedings were taken. One of these execution proceedings was commenced by an application dated 12 September 1946. In these proceedings there was a further compromise on 15 February 1946 (1947?) by which it was agreed that out of the arrears Rs. 100 should be paid by 12 April 1947, and the balance Rs. 53-5-0 should be paid by 17 May 1947. It was also agreed that if these two sums were not paid, execution would proceed. Arrears were not paid and a fresh application for execution was made on 18 July 1947, stating that the whole sum of Rs. 153-5.0 had not been paid. In this application objections were filed under Section 47, Civil P.C., by the judgment-debtors appellants. They objected that they were not bound by the compromise; that the rent upto 30 April 1916, at the enhanced rent had been paid and the decree had ceased to be operative. It was accordingly prayed that the execution proceedings be dismissed. In the meanwhile, the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, came into force on 1 October 1946. The question, therefore, arose in considering the application for execution dated 18 July 1947, whether the requirements of Secs.3 and 14 of that Act were satisfied. Both the Courts below have held that there was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 3 (a) of the Act in so far as notice of demand from the landlord was concerned and that in any case the judgment-debtors were net entitled to the benefit of Section 14 because they had failed to comply with the requirements of the proviso to that section.

(3.) The Courts below have construed the filing of the application for execution and the notice issued by the Court to the judgment-debtors as notice of demand. This view is clearly untenable. If such a construction were placed upon the provisions of Section 3 (a), then Section 3 would become meaningless. Section 3 provides that no suit shall be filed except on one or more of the following grounds, and one of the grounds mentioned is that rent has not been paid within one month of the service upon him of the notice of demand. These words clearly indicate that the filing of the suit itself is not a notice of demand : that must be some other notice given before the suit is filed.