EMPEROR Vs. RANCHHODLAL HIRABHAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question referred to this full bench is whether Section 7 of Act XXIV of 1946 makes punishable the contravention of orders deemed to be orders made under the Act by virtue of the provisions of Section 17(2) of the Act. As it is well-known, the war emergency came to an end on April 1, 1946, and six months thereafter on September 30, 1946, the Defence of India Act and the rules made thereunder ceased to be operative, and all orders which were made under those rules would also have come to an end but for the Ordinance which was promulgated on September 25, 1946. Under that Ordinance power was given to the Central Government to issue orders in order to control the production, supply and distribution, etc. of essential commodities, and under Section 5 the orders which were made under the rules of the Defence of India Act were continued, and Section 8 of the Ordinance made penal the contravention of any order made or deemed to be made under Section 3 of that Ordinance. Therefore, it is dear that the Ordinance provided not only for the issuing of orders in future but saved orders already made and made penal the contravention of orders to be made ana orders already made and continued by Section 5 of the Ordinance.

(2.) Then we come to the Act which calls for an interpretation at our hands, and that is Act XXIV of 1946. Section 3 is the enabling section which gives power to the Central Government to issue orders for the purpose of controlling production, supply, distribution, etc. of essential commodities just as Section 3 of the Ordinance had given a similar power to the Government. Section 17 of the Act is the re-pealing and saving section. That section repeals Ordinance XVIII of 1946. Having repealed it, it proceeds to save the orders already made or deemed to be made under that Ordinance, and Sub-clause (2) of that section says this: Any order made or deemed to be made under the said Ordinance and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue in force and be deemed to be an order made under this Act. The penal section is Section 7 which provides: If any person contravenes any order made under section 3, he shall be punishable in the manner provided in that section.

(3.) Now, it is contended on benalf of the accused by Mr. Amin that looking to Section 7 of the Act, it is clear that what is made penal is only the contravention of an order made under Section 3; the section in terms does not make penal the contravention of an order deemed to be made under Section 17. Mr. Amin further strengthens his argument by pointing out that the Ordinance which was repealed by this Act made it perfectly clear under Section 8 that what was to be punished was not merely the contravention of an order made but also the contravention of an order deemed to be made, and it is argued that the difference in the language used in Section 8 of the Ordinance and that in Section 7 of the Act clearly leads to the inference that while the Legislature when passing the Ordinance wanted to punish the contravention of an order deemed to be made, the Legislature in passing Act XXIV of 1946 intended only to punish the contravention of an order made under Section 3 and not the contravention of an order deemed to be made under Section 17.