PUGALUMPERUMAL PILLAI Vs. THANGATHAMMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of Rajamannar, J., as he then was, reversing the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin, in A.S. No. 10 of 1944, which in its turn reversed: the decree of the District Munsiff of Tuticorin in O.S. No. 236 of 1942. As the facts and circumstances have been stated in great detail in the judgment appealed against, we do not consider it necessary to set them out at all. What the true construction of the deed of gift dated 8 May, 1905, executed by Pichiyarammal in favour of her daughter Veeraperumal Ammal is, is the only subject of controversy. If the donee Veeraperumal Ammal took the property the subject-matter of the gift, as an absolute property, then, the appellant necessarily fails. If, on the other hand, what was donated under Ex. P-7 in favour of Veeraperumal Ammal is only a life estate, or a woman's estate as is known under the Hindu law, then it is the common case that the appellant will succeed.

(2.) The relevant portions of the gift deed are as follows: As I have given away to you the property in the schedule herein worth Rs. 1,500 as stridhanam gift, you shall hold and enjoy the aforesaid property hereditarily and from son to grandson and so on as long as the sun and moon last. After your lifetime, your, issues if there are any, shall get the aforesaid property. If you have no male or female issues, the aforesaid property shall revert to me and to my male heirs. I shall, till my lifetime, reside jointly with you in the thatched house mentioned in the schedule. The learned Judge, after an exhaustive consideration of some of the leading cases, relating to the construction of such deeds of gift and wills and relying upon the meaning of the terms mentioned in the deed, came to the conclusion that Veeraperumal Ammal took the properties absolutely under the gift deed.

(3.) The appellant's counsel urges as the first contention that what was intended by the donor was the granting of a life estate to Veeraperumal Ammal with a remainder to her, issues and that this is made plain by the second sentence showing that the donor wanted the issue of Veeraperumal Ammal to get the property after her death. He further contends that as the clause stood, in the absence of any issue for Veeraperumal Ammal, the property should revert to the donor and her male heirs. There is a defeasance clause or a reverter which shows. that the donee had only a life estate. No powers of alienation as such have been granted in favour of the donee and from this fact an inference is sought to be drawn that the intention of the donor was in favour of a life estate and not of an absolute one. For this purpose, Ex. P-4, a sale deed dated 12 February, 1930, executed by Veeraperumal Ammal, the donee, is referred to. But we are satisfied that no guidance in the construction of Ex. P-7 can be gained by looking at an absolutely different kind of document executed by the donee twenty-five years after the date of gift.