MUNICIPAL BOARD Vs. DRRADHA BALLABH PATHAK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a defendant's appeal. The defendant happens to be the Municipal Hoard, Mathura. The suit was instituted by the respondent, Radha Ballabh Pathak, for an injunction to restrain the appellant Board from "making any distress of the plaintiff for the recovery of the amount of Rs. 334-10-3 the alleged water tax...for the period 1 July 1939 to 31 March 1943." The tax claimed was in respect of a building known as Old Police Outpost. It belongs to the Government. It was let to the plaintiff-respondent who, after making certain temporary alterations, further sublet it to a number of sub-tenants. During the period for which the tax is claimed, the plaintiff-respondent was not in occupation of the building. He was not the owner because the Government was the owner. He was not the occupier because the sub-tenants were occupying the building. Therefore, he was neither the owner nor the occupier during the period in question. The suit was de-creed by the Court of first instance and the decree of that Court was confirmed by the lower appellate Court. Aggrieved by the decision of the lower appellate Court, the defendant Board has come in second appeal to this Court.

(2.) The first contention raised on behalf of the Board is that the plaintiff- respondent is liable to pay this tax. It is admitted that the decision of this question depends upon the interpretation to be placed upon the provisions of Section 149, U.P. Municipalities Act (II

(2.) of 1916). It is rightly conceded by the learned Counsel, for the appellant that Section 149 (1) does not apply to the case and that Section 149 (2) governs it. His contention is that it is either section 149 (2) (a) or (c) which is the relevant provision and according to which the plaintiff respondent is liable for the payment of this tax. I am unable to accept this contention, because it is plain to me that it is Section 149 (2) (b) which governs the case. According to this, when a property is sub-let, the tax is recoverable from the "superior lessor." I understand that the expression "superior lessor" has been used in contradistinction to the expression "sub-lessor." Whenever a property is sublet, there is a superior lessor, there is his {lessee and the lessee himself becomes a sub-lessor with regard to the sub-lessee. It is impossible to describe the sub- lessor as a superior lessor and to describe the original lessor as somebody else. Learned Counsel for the appellant has tried to reason out from the various provisions of this section that the intention of the legislature was that in a case like this the tax should be payable by the sub-lessor. There remains no scope for logic when the language of the statute is plain. Whatever may have been the wisdom that guided the legislature in enacting a provision like this it is not for the Court to make surmises about it. A Court has got to administer a statute as it stands. Reading Section 149 in its plain and grammatical sense, I have not the least doubt that in a case where a property has been sublet, it is not the sub- lessor who is liable to pay the taxes. There is, thus, no force in the first contention advanced on behalf of the appellant.