POPATLAL GOKULCHAND Vs. RAMCHANDRA NARAYANRAO GANORKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application for revision of a finding on a preliminary issue given by Mr. M.L. Shrivastava, Civil Judge, class I, Daryapur, on 11th February 1947, in civil Suit No. 66-A of 1946.

(2.) THE defendant is the applicant here and in the suit he had raised a preliminary objection that the suit was incompetent because permission of the Rent Controller was not obtained before filing the suit. The suit was filed on 4th July 1946. Admittedly, on that date the previous Rent Control Order (the Central Provinces and Berar House Rent Control Order, 1942) was not applied to Daryapur. Subsequently, however, the Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946, was passed and received the assent of the Governor-General on 28th September 1946. It was first published in the Central Provinces and Berar Gazette (Extraordinary) on 1st October 1946 on which date it was brought into force. The operations of the Act were extended to Daryapur on 15th November 1946 by a notification. It was contended that the Act and the House Rent Control Order, 1947, promulgated under Section 2 of the Act, were retrospective in their operation and para. 13 of the Order made the suit incompetent without the written permission of the Controller.

(3.) THIS provision contains no express words making it retrospective, nor is there any implication that it is meant to apply to past transactions or pending proceedings. The right of a landlord to terminate the tenancy of his tenant must be determined according to the state of affairs existing on the date he files the suit and the plaintiff in such a case acquires a vested right which cannot be taken away except by legislation which is either expressly or by necessary implication made retrospective. That delay takes place in deciding a case is neither here nor there. This is supported by the well-known maxim actus curie neminem gravabit. In my opinion there are no circumstances which take the Act or the Order out of the application of the rule that all legislation affecting substantive rights are prospective. It was argued that It he matter is one of procedure. In my opinion if a valid notice could be given under the Transfer of Property Act before the Central Provinces Act (XI [11] of 1946 was extended to Daryapur, a substantive right to eject a tenant became vested in the landlord which could not be taken away from him except on proof of retrospective legislation. Such legislation has not been brought to my notice and I must accordingly hold, as the lower Court did, that the present suit of the plaintiff non-applicant is not affected.