THIKKA SURYA RAO Vs. SIRANGU SATHIRAJU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code in M.C. No. 11 of 1946 on the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Amalapuram, it was declared under Section 145, Clause (4) and (6) that P.W. 5 was having possession of the disputed land through his agent P.W. 1 ever since delivery was given to him on 7 October, 1945 and that he had been having such possession, of the land on 15 May, 1946 when the preliminary order was passed.

(2.) The petitioners in this Court were respondents 1 to 3 in the lower Court and on their behalf Mr. V.T. Rangaswami Ayyangar raises a question regarding the validity of the order of the lower Court on the ground that the Magistrate who pronounced the order in Court, on the 6 January, 1947 did not conduct the inquiry or pass orders but had only pronounced an order written and signed by his prede-cessor on the 4 January, 1947. It was Mr. K. Kondal Rao, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who heard the evidence and passed orders without pronouncing the same before he was relieved of that office and succeeded by Syed Mahaboob Sahib Bahadur who pronounced the orders written and signed by his predecessor. On this ground it is objected that there was no proper disposal of M.C. No. 11 of 1946 and that the order sought to be revised was void and without jurisdiction and therefore inoperative.

(3.) It is urged that the final order of the lower Court is a judgment within the meaning of the word in Secs.366 and 367, Criminal Procedure Code and therefore on the authority of certain decisions, I am asked to hold that a succeeding Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment written and signed by his predecessor while the latter was not functioning as a Magistrate. There is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code akin to Order XX, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, which lays down that a judge may pronounce a judgment written but not pronounced by his predecessor. In Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham), Vol. IX, paragraphs 260 to 264, there is a discussion regarding the meaning and purport of the word Judgment in criminal procedings and the conclusion stated there is that by the word Judgment is meant a final order in a trial terminating in the conviction or acquittal of the accused. In Section 2., Clause (9), Civil Procedure Code, judgment is defined as a " Statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order". As there is no definition of the word Judgment in the Criminal Procedure Code at all it will be proper to adopt the explanation of the word as understood in the English Courts referred to in Halsbury's Laws of England. In Emperor V/s. Maheswara Kondaya (1908) I.L.R. 31 Mad. 543 it is laid down that though the word Judgment is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, it is sufficiently clear from Secs.366 and 367, Criminal Procedure Code, that it is intended to indicate the final order in a trial terminating in either the conviction or the acquit-tal of the accused. In a very recent decision in Kuppuswami Rao V/s. The King (1908) I.L.R. 31 Mad. 543, Kania, C.J., delivering the Judgment of the Federal Court of India has accepted the interpre-tation of the word Judgment to be the same as given by this Court in Emperor V/s. Maheswara Kondaya (1908) I.L.R. 31 Mad. 543 and approved of by Sulaiman, J., in Hori Ram Singh's case3.