CHIRANJI LALL Vs. DURGA DUTT TRIPATHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The two petitioners, young men of 27 and 28, have been convicted under Section 341, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to simple imprisonment for one month and a fine of us. 50 each. The prosecution case was that on 24 April 1945, at about 4 P.M. they had wrongfully restrained one Durgadutt Tripathi, a cloth inspector of Buxar, while the latter was going home on an "ekka" with a bundle of cloth and other miscellaneous articles to attend the bidai ceremony of his sister. The two petitioners were alleged to have stopped the "ekka" and prevented the cloth inspector from going home. They took the cloth inspector to the thana where an information was given by the cloth inspector about the wrongful restraint. A counter informmation was also given by the two petitioners alleging that the cloth inspector was removing cloth in contravention of the rules then in force regarding the purchase and movement of cloth. The local police submitted a final report in both the informations. The cloth inspector then filed a complaint on which the present petitioners, were put on trial with the result stated above.

(2.) On behalf of the petitioners three points have been urged before me. Firstly, it is con tended that in the earliest statement made by the cloth inspector no allegation was made that any physical obstruction had been given to him. It is contended that the conviction of the petitioners under Section 341, Indian Penal Code, is bad in law in the absence of a clear finding that they had physically obstructed the cloth inspector from proceeding in the direction in which he wanted to proceed. Secondly, it has been contended that even if the petitioners had physically obstructed the cloth inspector from proceeding in the direction in which he wanted to proceed, they had done so in good faith, and cannot be held guilty of any offence. The third point which has been urged, relates to the question of the sentence.

(3.) In the earliest statement which the cloth inspector had made, namely, the information which he gave at the Police station, he had mentioned that he was wrongfully restrained, though no details of any physical act of obstruction-were given. The Courts below have considered the evidence, and on that they have found that the cloth inspector was prevented from proceeding homeward on the "ekka." That in my opinion, would amount to preventing the cloth inspector from proceeding in the direction in which he wanted to proceed, and would, therefore, be wrongful restraint as defined in Section 889, Indian Penal Code. As to the second point, my attention has been drawn to the evidence of the cloth inspector and that of the Sub-Inspector of Police. It appears that the cloth inspector was taking ornaments and Benarsi "saris" which were not controlled, some pairs of new. "dhotis" and "saris". The plea of the cloth inspcetor was that he purchased some of the cloth and had taken some for approval. Comment has been made before me that the cloth inspector was not in a position to produce any voucher in support of his plea of purchase. Whatever that may be, I am unable to accept the contention that the petitioners are protected by good faith such as is mentioned in Section 79, Indian Penal Code. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied on a decision of this Court in Lal Behari Singh V/s. Emperor A.I.R. 1939 Pat. 256 where a bullock cart was stopped by some persons who were on the look out for a kidnapped girl. In view of the facts of that case, the plea based on Section 79, Indian Penal Code, was accepted. Section 79 Indian Penal Code, is in two parts. The first part says that nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is-justified by law. It is clear to me that that part does not apply in the present case. The petitioners were not justified by law in either appeal bending the cloth inspector or compelling him to go to the thana nor were they justified in preventing him from going in the direction in which he wanted to go. If the petitioners had any suspicion that the cloth inspector had contravened any of the rules relating to the purchase and movement of cloth, they could have given an information to the authorities concerned. They had no legal right to restrain the free movement of the cloth inspector. The second part of Section 79 Indian Penal Code, states that nothing is an offence which is done by any person who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake; of law in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it. The Coutr below have found that there-was no good faith in the petitioners. To satisfy the Court of good faith, a person must show that he acted with due care and attention, and had reasonable ground primes facie for believing that he ought to do what he did. It seems to me that the petitioners in their zeal over-stepped the limits of law. I am unable to accept the contention that they acted in good faith.