(1.) The appeal in this case is by the employer against the order of the Commissioner acting under the "Workmen's Compensation Act granting compensation for an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment of one Meghan awarding Rs. 231-1-7 for permanent disability and in the case of one Bidesi compensation amounting to Rs. 462-3-2. Under Section 30 of the Act an appeal is given to this Court in a case which raises a substantial question of law, but it provides that no appeal lies in a case in which the amount in dispute is less than Rs. 300. So far as Meghan's case is concerned, that condition is not complied with as I have already said, because the compensation awarded is only Rs. 231 odd although in the other case it was in excess of the Rs. 300, that is in Bidesi's case. Now it is contended by the learned advocate who appears on behalf of the appellant, that the words of the Proviso to Section 30 must be construed as entitling the employer to appeal where the total amount in the appeal involves a sum of more than Rs. 300. If that argument is to be accepted, then the rights of one workman would be governed by the conditions and circumstances of the case of the other workman. That in my judgment, as I have said, is an impossible contention. We must treat each of these cases as separate cases although they may be the subject-matter of one appeal, and that being so, the appeal so far as Meghan's case is concerned, in my judgment, does not lie to this Court.
(2.) The circumstances of both cases however are very similar with regard to the point which is in dispute. The learned Commissioner has come to the conclusion that sufficient cause within the Proviso to Section 10 has been shown entitling him to take cognizance of these cases, although the claim was made more than six months after the accident. That the claim before the Commissioner was made six months after the accident is not in dispute; but it is contended by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the workmen that the words "unless the claim for compensation with respect to such accident has been instituted within six months" must be construed as meaning a claim made against the employer and although this Court is not entitled to go into the evidence, we have been referred to the evidence in support of that contention. The evidence of Bidesi himself is that he was three months in the hospital, that he received nothing from Matin Babu and afterwards when he went to him he refused to give him anything.
(3.) Now, in my judgment, even if we had jurisdiction to go into the evidence it would be impossible to hold on that evidence a view contrary to that held by the Commissioner that either a claim for compensation had been made to the employer, or to use the words of the Section itself, a claim had "been instituted within six months." The question whether the words "has been instituted within six months" mean a claim against the employer or the institution of legal proceedings before the Commissioner has been the subject-matter of a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Abdul Karim V/s. Eastern Bengal Railway , where Buckland A.C.J. made the observation that the word "institute" in Sub-clause 1, Section 10, is an unfortunate substitution for the word "make" in the English Act. The words in the Act are the following: Unless the claim for compensation with respect to such accident has been made within six months from the occurrence of the accident causing the injury, or in case of death within six months from the time of death.