(1.) This appeal is directed against the order of the District Judge of Shahabad, dated 14 April 1937, in which he has held that the appellants, who were the petitioners before him for letters of administration of the estate of one Amir Chandra were liable to pay court-fee on the total value of the properties, the subject-matter of the application. The property consisted of Government loans to the value of Rupees 2,19,400, money in deposit with the Bank Rs. 1,00,000 and shares in limited companies valued at Rs. 79,785. The actual figures are not in dispute and are immaterial for the purposes of decision of the point in issue.
(2.) The contention in the Court below, and indeed the contention in this Court is that, as these properties were the properties of the joint family of which the applicants were members, the properties must be treated as trust properties and therefore not liable to the ad valorem court-fee demanded by the order of the Judge. Reliance was placed upon Schedule 3, Court-fees Act, which it is contended by implication provides that the property of the description which I have stated, that is to say property of the joint family, is not liable for court-fees. The form Annexure A provided under Schedule 3 sets out various items of property the description of which is to be given in an application for letters of administration. Annexure B is headed "Schedule of Debts etc." and not only includes debts owing by the estate of the deceased, the funeral expenses and mortgage encumbrances, but also property held in trust not beneficially or with general power to confer a beneficial interest and other property not subject to duty.
(3.) It seems to me clear if I were to decide the matter, although I do not decide it, that the total of items in Annexure B is to be deducted from the total of Annexure A: that much is clear, the duty being payable on the balance. Section 19-I provides that the Court must be satisfied that the fees payable under No 11 of Schedule 1 are paid before entertaining an application for letters of administration so far as the actual valuation is concerned. The provision made in Section 19-H gives jurisdiction to the Collector to decide these matters finally, but it seems to be perfectly clear from the provision of Section 19-1 to which I have already referred that the Judge had jurisdiction to enter into the question which he determined by his order and which is the subject-matter of this appeal.