BIRANCHI SINGH Vs. NAND KUMAR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff-respondent to recover arrears of manhunda rent for the years 1339 to 1342 Fasli. The suit having been decreed by the Courts below, the defendants have preferred this second appeal. As the suit was instituted by the plaintiff after the Bihar Tenancy Act came into force, it is contended on behalf of the appellant that the period of limitation which will govern the suit is the period provided by the new Act and so the claim for the years 1339 and 1340 Fasli is time-barred under Schedule 3, Art. 2(b)(ii) of that Act. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that inasmuch as the claim for the rent of the years 1339 and 1340 arose before the passing of the new Act, the suit must be governed by the Bengal Tenancy Act as it stood before the new Act was passed.

(2.) The parties have cited before us a number of decisions, the most recent decision being that of a Division Bench of this Court in Shaikh Reyasat V/s. Gopi Nath Missir Reported in A.I.R (1939) Pat. 122 which supports the view put forward on behalf of the appellant. This decision has already been followed by this Bench in Second Appeals Nos. 978 and 979 of 1936, but as its correctness was challenged both in the present appeal and in Second Appeals Nos. 978 and 979 of 1936 and as we have been pressed to refer this case to a larger Bench, I propose to deal with the matter at some length. That the question is not free from difficulty will be evident from what follows.

(3.) It is well settled that a statute which takes away or impairs rights acquired under the existing law must not be construed to have a retrospective force, unless by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the Legislature which passed it. It is true that ordinarily the enactments which regulate procedure take effect immediately on the principle that "no suitor has a vested interest in the procedure" and that an Act of limitation, being a law of procedure, will ordinarily govern all proceedings, to which its terms are applicable, from the moment of its enactment. But as we pointed out in Khusalbhai V/s. Kabhai (1881) 6 Bom. 26 this rule must admit of the qualification that when the retrospective application of the statute of limitation would destroy vested rights, or inflict such hardship or injustice as could not have been within the contemplation of the Legislature, then the statute is not any more than any other law, to be construed retrospectively. The propositions enunciated above have not only been affirmed in a series of decisions, but they have received statutory recognition in Section 6 and Section 8, Clause (c), Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, 1917, and the new Bihar Tenancy Act must be construed subject to them. Section 8, Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, provides that: Where any Bihar and Orissa Act repeals any enactment hitherto made, or hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed.