RAM KISHON RAM BHAKAT Vs. SATYA NARAIN BHAKAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A preliminary objection has been put forward to the effect that no appeal lies in this case, having regard tot the provisions of Section 102, Civil P.C. view of the fact; that the suit with reference to which this appeal arises appears to have been valued at Rs. 408 the preliminary objection must prevail. An alternative application has however been filed to the effect that the appeal may be treated as an application for revision, and this application has been granted.

(2.) It appears that the plaintiffs obtained a decree in the Court of the Munsif at Rampurbat on 25 February 1931. This decree was put into execution at Rampurhat and a sum of Rs. 80 was realized. On 1 February 1933 the decree-holders applied to the Munsif at Rampurhat for a certificate of non-satisfaction and for the transmission of the decree for execution to the Jangipur Court in accordance with the provisions of Section 39, Civil P.C. The decree was duly transmitted for execution to the Jangipur Court, but it appears that No further steps were taken at the Jangipur Court towards the execution of the decree with the result that on 2nd March 1936: the decree was returned to the Court of the Munsif at Rampurhat. In the meantime, on 31 January 1936, the decree-holders filed a further application for execution at Rampurhat. This application appears to have been registered at Rampurhat on 18 March 1936, and it was subsequently1 transferred to the Munsif at Jangipur for execution. The application was ultimately dismissed on 11 July 1936. Subsequently another application for execution was filed on 30 January 1937, and it is with this last application that we are now dealing. The first Court held that the application: dated 30 January 1937 had been filed in time. The lower Appellate Court held however that the application in question was time barred on account of the fact that the previous application for execution dated 31 January 1936 had not been filed in the proper Court in accordance with law as required by the provisions of Art. 182(5), Limitation Act.

(3.) It has been argued by the learned advocate for the petitioners in this case that the application for execution dated 31 January 1936 was properly received by the Munsif at Rampurhat, even although the decree had been transferred for execution to the Court of the Munsif at Jangipur. In my opinion however this case is governed by the principles which have been laid down by the Privy Council in Maharajah of Bobbili V/s. Narasarajupeda Baliara Simhulu Bahadur (1916) 3 A.I.R. P.C. 16. In that case their Lordships of the Judicial Committee pointed out that after a decree had been transferred to another Court for execution, the proper Court to which a subsequent application for execution should be made was the transferee Court, as that was the Court whose duty it then was to execute the decree so far as it could be executed by that Court. It is quite clear from the facts of the case now before me that on 31 January 1936 the decree was actually pending for execution in the Court of the Munsif at Jangipur and it was in that Court that any further application for execution should have been filed. It was not until 2 March, 1936, that the execution case was retransferred by the Jangipur Court to the Rampurhat Court. The learned advocate for the petitioners contends that this date, namely 2 March, 1936, should be taken as the date of a final order passed on an application for execution within the meaning of Art. 182(5), Limitation Act, and that if this contention is accepted, he argues that the present application for execution would be in time. In my opinion, however, it cannot be said that any final order with reference to the application for execution was passed on 2 March, 1936. All that happened on this date was that the Jangipur Court retransferred the execution proceedings to the Rampurhat Court and these particular proceedings remained in the same condition as they were, when they were transferred to the Jangipur Court on 1 February 1933. It certainly cannot be 3aid therefore that any final order was passed on 2 March, 1936, with reference to these proceedings. To my mind, it is quite clear that the application for execution, which was filed on 31 January 1936, was not made to a proper Court within the meaning of Art. 182(5), Limitation Act. It follows therefore that this case has been rightly decided by Court below. The appeal is therefore is therefore dismissed. This application for revision is therefore rejected. I make no order with regard to costs. Ted. I make no order with regard to costs.