YADEO GANESH SUBHEDAR Vs. SECRETARY OF STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal relates to the correct interpretation of Section 15(4), Police Act, 1861. The plaintiff is the proprietor of a khel in Mauza Hingani in Wardha Tahsil. Disputes occurred in this village and so punitive police were quartered there under Section 15(1), Police Act. The plaintiff was then required by the Magistrate to pay Rs. 300 towards the expenses of this additional force under Section 15(4), Police Act. He states that the Magistrate has taken into consideration not only his means within the disturbed area, that is to say within the village of Hingani, but also his means from outside sources. This he states is illegal. I quite agree that under Section 15(4) only the means within the disturbed area can be considered. The question therefore resolves itself into this: Did the Magistrate in making this assessment take into consideration the plaintiff's means from outside the disturbed area? The burden is on the plaintiff because the act being an official act will be presumed in the first instance to have been regularly performed in accordance with law.

(2.) BEFORE however dealing with the matter on which the plaintiff relies in proof of his case, I will examine the meaning of the word "means." It has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as being "the resources at one's disposal for effecting some object." According to that definition what the Magistrate had to consider then was the resources at the plaintiff's disposal within the village of Hingani for paying the Rs. 300 to which he had been assessed. The word "means" has also been used in Order 33,R.1, Civil P.C., and the meaning attached to it is much the same. Mulla at p. 963 states that the words "refer to property over which the petitioner has actual control." Therefore, what the Magistrate was entitled to look to was not only the income derived from this village but also the means which the plaintiff had of raising the money required for the assessment. The next point to be observed is that the Magistrate is given absolute discretion in this matter under Section 15(4). The Section runs: The Magistrate of the district, after such inquiry as he may deem necessary, shall apportion....such apportionment shall be made according to the Magistrate's judgment of the respective means within such area of such inhabitants.

(3.) NOTHING could have been easier for the plaintiff than to show what his income within the Hingani area actually was. He has not attempted to show that this figure was so excessively high that it could only have been derived by taking into consideration the income from outside sources. Therefore that document, Ex. P. 3, does not carry us any further. Apart from that all that he relies on is what he calls an admission or rather a want of denial by the defendant of the allegation made by the plaintiff in the plaint. The allegation is that the Magistrate took into consideration the plaintiff's means from villages other than Hingani. The defendant's written statement is to this effect: It is denied that the costs apportioned on the plaintiff is not according to the means of the plaintiff within the disturbed area. The apportionment of costs was made according to the Magistrate's judgment of the respective means of the persons taxed within the area in disturbed state.