LAWS(PVC)-1938-9-73

SANKARANARAYANA AIYAR FIRM (INSOLVENT) NOW REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE, HIGH COURT Vs. YEGNALAKSHMI AMMAL

Decided On September 16, 1938
SANKARANARAYANA AIYAR FIRM (INSOLVENT) NOW REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE, HIGH COURT Appellant
V/S
YEGNALAKSHMI AMMAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I have been invited in this case to set aside the order passed by the District Munsiff of Ambasamudram dismissing an application made to him by the petitioner under Section 73, Civil Procedure Code.

(2.) The facts, so far as they are necessary to be stated for the disposal of the questions of law raised before me, lie within a narrow compass. The respondents had obtained a decree in O.S. No. 252 of 1932 against certain judgment-debtors and had applied for execution by attachment and sale of certain properties (E.A. No. 737 of 1935). The properties were sold and the sale proceeds were brought into Court on the 8 of November, 1935. Before this, however, the petitioners, who had a decree passed in their favour in October, 1934, against the same judgment-debtors (O.S. No. 156 of 1934) had made an application on the 7 of November, 1935, that is, a day before the sale proceeds were actually brought into Court, for rateable distribution. If this were all, no objection could be raised against the application, but it appears that they had been adjudicated insolvents on 6 September, 1935, that is, about a couple of months before the application for rateable distribution was presented by them, and the first question which falls to be determined is whether the application could have been validly made by them after they had been adjudicated. The question has been decided by the lower Court in favour of the respondent and this revision has consequently been filed to test the correctness of that order.

(3.) A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the respondents that inasmuch as another remedy would be available to the petitioners, a revision of the order passed by the District Munsiff does not lie and the Court should not in any case interfere in its revisional jurisdiction but leave the matter to be decided by a regular suit. In view however of the real contention raised in this case it would not be only convenient but necessary to determine the question whether the lower Court has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law or has committed any material irregularity in exercising the same. The revision has been fully argued on behalf of the parties and I would therefore proceed to deal with the main question involved in the case.