NALAM LAKSHMIKANTHAM Vs. NALAM RAMALINGAYYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Some of the plaintiffs in the suit have preferred this appeal against a decree which declined to file an award and embody it in a decree of Court. The parties are descendants of different branches of what may be referred to as the Nalam family which had founded various public charities in the circars. During the period of the first defendant's management, disputes arose between them and as a result, a muchilika referring the disputes to arbitration was executed by the parties on 8th June, 1931. Reference was made in the muchilika itself to the questions which the arbitrator was to decide. We may refer in particular to questions 4 and 5, namely, (4) How is the management of the choultry at Rajahmundry by the first defendant from 1919 up to date? How is the management of the Dharmakarthas of the other charitable institutions for the past 12 years? (5) What is the nature of the scheme to be framed regarding the future administration of the said institutions? The arbitrator passed an award on 10 January, 1932 and stated it as his conclusion that the first defendant's management of the choultry had not been blameworthy. As regards future management, he drew up an elaborate scheme consisting of about 35 clauses. As the parties were not prepared to accept this award, the plaintiffs filed this suit on 4 July, 1932.

(2.) The defendants raised various objections, out of which it is sufficient for the purpose of this appeal to refer to one, which formed the subject-matter of the 8th issue. Though this issue has not been very clearly worded, the contention was made clear in the course of the argument in the lower Court and it was understood as raising the question, whether the award was illegal and cannot be made a decree of Court as it related to matters which should be made the subject-matter of a suit under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code. The learned Subordinate Judge upheld this contention and dismissed the suit on this ground. He also found against the plaintiffs on certain other contentions; but in the view that we take on the objection based on Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is unnecessary-to deal with the other objections.

(3.) Before us, the learned Counsel for the appellants has mainly rested his argument in support of the appeal on the principle laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in Appanna Poricha V/s. Narasinga Poricha and recently reaffirmed by a Division Bench in Shanmukham Chetty V/s. Govinda Chetty (1937) 46 L.W. 426. We do not think that the principle of those decisions helps the appellants in the present case. All that was there laid down was that where a person is seeking to assert or vindicate his individual or personal right in respect of the management of a charity, the mere fact that a relief asked for may happen to be one of the kinds specified in Section 92 will not preclude the maintainability of the suit without conforming to the provisions of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. But what the plaintiffs are now attempting to do and what the award has purported to do is really not merely to protect the individual or personal right of a party. The arbitrator was required to investigate the nature of the management of the various charitable trusts by the parties in management thereof and was also asked to lay down a scheme for the future management of the institutions. These cannot reasonably be regarded as matters arising out of the private right of any particular individual. As pointed out in Sundara Aiyar V/s. Varada Aiyar , the fact that the disputing parties belong to the family or families in which the management of the institution is vested, will not of itself take the case out of the purview of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code if the object of the proceedings is to safeguard the interests of the institution or obtain directions for its proper management. See also Krishna Aiyangar V/s. Alwarappa Aiyangar .