RAJE SHRINIWAS RAO Vs. SECRETARY OF STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) . 1. This is the plaintiff's appeal from the judgment of the First Additional District Judge, Akola, in Civil Appeal No. 43-A of 1936, decided on 24th August 1936, whereby the appellants 'suit was dismissed on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try it. The suit relates to three fields Survey Nos. 91/2,116/1 and 102 of mouza Deodhaba Which were granted originally in 1793 in inam by an ancestor of His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad. The plaintiff lays claim to these fields as being his inam fields and that claim is contested by the defendant. It is a well-recognized principle of law that the nature, and not the merits, of the claim (determine, the question of jurisdiction: G.I.P. Ry. Co. v. Amraoti Municipality ('12) 8 NLR 107. It is therefore necessary to look into the nature of the claim as made in the plaint. The plaintiff alleged in the plaint that the three fields referred to above were inam which had been granted to the plaintiff's predecessor as jagirdar, that the jagirdari village including the fields had passed under the temporary control of the Government in 1853 and that it was restored in 1878. When the jagir was restored to the plaintiff's predecessor it comprised also the fields in suit. The plaintiff disputed in the revenue Court the defendant's right to take possession of the fields but he was unsuccessful. He com-plains that the revenue authorities failed to interpret properly the terms of sanad granted to him. Both the Courts below concurred in holding that the suit was not triable by the Civil Court in view of Section 192(1)(a) and (b), Berar Land Revenue Code, 1928.

(2.) IN this Court the learned Counsel for the appellant in his argument covered a very wide ground, but it is unnecessary to refer to the points raised by him as the matter can be disposed of on the very basis adopted by the two Courts below. Agreeing with them, without prejudice to anything that could otherwise be said on behalf of the appellant, that the suit is one which falls under Section 192(1)(a) and (b), it cannot be overlooked that the plaintiff specifically raised the question of interpretation of the terms of his grant. The question is whether or not these fields were re-granted or, as the appellant would say, restored to the plaintiff in 1878. The determination of this issue depends on the true construction of the sanad, Ex. P-5, and the order passed by Sir R.J. Meade, Resident at Hyderabad on 9th August 1878, a copy of which was filed but was not exhibited in the case. The lower Appellate Court in deciding the issue ignored this aspect of the matter, although the fact that the question of construction of the aforesaid document appears to have been present to its mind as is clear from its judgment. Judging from the argument addressed here on behalf of the respondent it appears that the lower Appellate Court persuaded itself that Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 192(1), Berar Land Revenue Code, were not to be read subject to the proviso following Clause (e). I have no doubt that the proviso is applicable to all the clauses from (a) to (e) in the preceding part of Section 192(1). The proviso is as follows: Provided that nothing in this section shall bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in respect of the interpretation of any sanad, grant, contract or recorded order conferring a right to hold land free of land revenue or at less than the fair assessment.