OFFICIAL RECEIVER Vs. SAMUDRAVIJAYAN CHETTIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant is the Official Receiver of West Tanjore district. He represents the estate of one Ramappa Chettiar, an insolvent. The suit out of which this appeal arises was filed by Ramappa's son, Samudravijayan, for a declaration that his father has merely a life interest in certain immovable properties and for an injunction restraining the appellant from offering for sale more than the alleged life interest. He also sought a decree for partition of other properties. The properties in respect of which the plaintiff alleged his father has a life interest are described in Schedule A to the plaint and the properties in respect of which partition was sought in Schedules B and C. The suit succeeded so far as it concerned the properties described in Schedule A, but it was dismissed so far as it concerned the other properties. The appellant contends that the learned Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam who tried the case was wrong in holding that Ramappa's interest in the A schedule properties was limited to a life estate. He maintains that Ramappa's interest was that of an absolute owner. The appeal is limited to this question.

(2.) The original owner of the properties was one K.S. Ramu Chettiar, who died in 1873, leaving a widow Marudevi Animal, and an adopted son Samudravijayan. The adopted son died in 1897 leaving two sons, Ramappa (the father of the plaintiff) and Surendranath. They were the 38 and 39 defendants in the suit and are the 38 and 39 respondents in the appeal. Ramu Chettiar left a will under which properties set out in Schedule A were bequeathed to the widow, and it is common ground that she acquired an absolute interest in them. By a deed dated the 15th March, 1912, she gave these properties to Ramappa and Surendranath, and the dispute is with regard to the effect of this deed, the material portion of which reads as follows: On account of the affection I have towards my grandsons aforesaid - (1) Ramappa Chettiar and (2) Surendranath Chettiar - and in consideration of the service that is being rendered by them to me, and as only the said two persons are my proper heirs, I Have with all my heart and by means of this settlement deed given away this day the properties described in Schedule B hereof, to both of them aforesaid, with power to enjoy them with all rights. But from and out of the income from the said properties, I shall, during my life, pay the Government kist and enjoy the balance left. Afterwards both of them shall divide off the said properties into two moities as they please and enjoy the same. After the death of the said two persons, their (respective) heirs shall succeed thereto. Both of them, individuals numbers 1 and 2 shall enjoy the properties described in Schedule B aforesaid, without making any alienation thereof by way of gift, exchange, sale, etc.; the value of the nanja, punja, etc., and house described in Schedule B aforesaid is Rs. 16,000. To this effect I have with all my heart and bona fide executed this settlement deed. I have delivered two documents as title deeds hereto. This settlement deed shall remain with Surendranath Chettiar of you.

(3.) The appellant's case is that as the donor conveyed the suit properties "with power to enjoy them with all rights" she created an absolute title in the donees and any words which follow and are repugnant to an absolute title must be ignored. He relies on Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act which states that where on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction. The respondent contends that the document must be looked at as a whole and says that when this is done it is apparent that the intention of the donor was to give to Ramappa and Surendranath merely a life interest in the properties. He points to Section 82 of the Succession Act and argues that if the meaning of any clause in a will is to be collected from the entire instrument the same principle must apply when the Court is interpreting a deed of gift.