MT BECHAN KUER Vs. MAHARAJA OF CHOTA NAGPUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application in revision against an order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Ranchi, on 20 December 1937. Dissatisfied with that order, the petitioners, who were the second party in a proceeding under Section 145, Criminal P.C., before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, moved the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi who, on 10 March 1938, declined to interfere on the ground that there was no such defect of law or clear miscarriage of justice as would justify him in referring the matter to the High Court. The petitioners then applied to this Court on 9 May 1938, and on 11 May, Manohar Lall, J. issued a Rule. Mr. De, who appears for the opposite party, urges in limine that the application ought not to be heard in view of the principle laid down in Kelu Patra v. Iswar Parida A.I.R (1929) . Pat. 404 by a Bench of two Judges. That principle is that the High Court will not, as a general practice, entertain, in the absence of the most exceptional circumstances, an application in its criminal revisional jurisdiction after the expiry of 60 days from the date of the decision or order impugned, and that a fresh period of 60 days does not accrue from the date when the Sessions Judge (in the present case, the Additional Deputy Commissioner instead) refuses to make a reference under Section 438, Criminal P.C. Mr. Banerjee who appears for the petitioners, urges that the delay in applying to this Court was explained in para. 25 of the application in revision, and that Manohar Lall J. who issued the Rule, was satisfied with the explanation and must be taken to have condoned the delay. Upon this Mr. De points out that he was not a party before the Court when Manohar Lall J. issued the Rule.

(2.) The principle laid down in Kelu Patra V/s. Iswar Parida A.I.R . Pat. 404 is a principle of general application subject to what Macpherson J. called the most exceptional circumstances. Mr. Banerjee has endeavoured to make out a case of such circumstances by pointing out that pleaders in the mofassil are not aware of the practice of the High Court and that the petitioners include a pardanashin lady, being in fact the principal petitioner. But these can hardly be regarded as among the most exceptional circumstances. It is not pretended that there is any officially re-ported decision of this Court laying down anything to the contrary of what was laid down in Kelu patra V/s. Iswar Parida A.I.R (1929) . Pat. 404 nor does it appear that that decision has ever been dissented from in this Court, either in official or in other reports.

(3.) If the petitioners lawyer in the mofassil in the present case did not take care to acquaint himself with what appears to be the current of authorities on the point, that would only show that he was negligent, but would not make it one of the most exceptional circumstances. Nor can the pardanashin lady, who is the principal petitioner before me, make of her sex and parda an exceptional circumstance for the purposes of the Rule. My attention has been drawn to at least one other case from 15 Patna Law Times in which Kelu Patra V/s. Iswar Parida A.I.R (1929) . Pat. 404 was followed, but it is unnecessary to deal with that case because it has not been urged on behalf of the petitioners that there is any case showing anything to the contrary.