S GIRDHARILAL SON AND CO Vs. BKAPPINI GOWDER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I agree with Pandrang Row, J., that the present suit is maintainable and that the objection based on Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act must be overruled. The arguments that can be urged in favour of one view or the other have been fully set out in the judgments delivered by my learned brothers; it is therefore not necessary for me to deal with every one of them in detail or with the several decisions referred to in their judgments.

(2.) The relevant facts and dates are: The promissory note sued on was executed on 12 March, 1931, the Partnership Act except Section 69 came into force on 1st October, 1932, Section 69 came into force on 1 October, 1933, and this suit was filed in August, 1934. On these facts, the question arises, whether the plaintiffs who admittedly constitute a firm but had not got themselves registered before the date of the institution of the suit are entitled to maintain the suit. If the matter were wholly res Integra it may be open to argument whether the language of Section 69 of the Partnership Act clearly and necessarily applies to contracts entered into before the date of the coming into force of the Act. In Wright v. Greenroyd (1861) 1 B. and S. 758 : 121 E.R. 896 where the question arose with reference to Section 32 of the English Medical Act of 1858, Blackburn, J., thought that it was clear from the language of that section that the prohibition referred to a charge incurred after the 1 January, 1859. The language of that section was that: After the 1 January, 1859, no person shall be entitled to recover any charge in any Court of law for any medical or surgical advice, attendance or for the performance of any operation, or for any medicine which he shall have both prescribed and supplied, unless he shall prove upon the trial that he is registered under this Act.

(3.) As a matter of language, it is not easy to see any marked difference between the above words and the language of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. In view however of the way in which the general words of this section of the Partnership Act have been understood in many of the reported decisions, I prefer to deal with the case on the footing that, but for other considerations, the language employed is capable of being applied even to contracts entered into before the Act came into force and to causes of action that accrued before that date.