(1.) This is a defendant's appeal from an order of a learned single Judge of this Court. The appeal arises out of a suit for damages for malicious prosecution. The facts of the case are set out in detail in the order of the learned single Judge and we do not consider it necessary to recapitulate them here. Suffice it to say for the purposes of this appeal that it has been, found by the lower Appellate Court, and the finding cannot now be disturbed, that at the instance of Ramji Mal proceedings under Section 13, Legal Practitioners Act, were directed against the plaintiff. There can be no dispute now that in attempting to have these proceedings initiated Ramji Mal was actuated by malice. The allegations which, he made against the plaintiff were false and it has been held that they were made maliciously. The learned single Judge has in these circumstances held that an action for damages for malicious prosecution was maintainable and he has awarded the sum of Rs. 600 to the plaintiff as compensation for the loss he has sustained as a result of the proceedings against him under the Legal Practitioners Act.
(2.) In appeal it was contended for the defendants that though a suit for damages for libel might be maintainable against Ramji Mal at the instance of the plaintiff, a suit for malicious prosecution was not maintainable inasmuch as the proceedings- under Section 13, Legal Practitioners Act, did not amount to a criminal prosecution. It cannot be disputed however that a suit for damages for malicious prosecution is maintainable though the proceedings complained of are not strictly criminal. In the course of his judgment the learned single Judge-refers at length to the decision in the case in Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co. V/s. Eyre (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 674. In that case it was hold that an action for damages for malicious prosecution would lie where the proceedings which were not strictly criminal were brought against the plaintiff, provided those proceedings were initiated maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. It was held that: An action would lie for falsely and maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause presenting a petition under the Companies Acts of 1862 and 1867, to wind up a trading company, oven although no pecuniary loss or special damage to the company can be proved, for the presentation of the petition is from its very nature, calculated to injure the credit of the company.
(3.) Now it would appear plain that if an action for damages for malicious prosecution would lie in the case where a petition under the Companies Act were presented falsely and maliciously such an action would lie in the case of initiation of proceedings under Section 13, Legal Practitioners Act, if the information upon which the proceedings were instituted was falsely and maliciously laid. Learned Counsel for the defendant contended however that proceedings under the Companies Act stood in an exceptional position. He contended that in the case of such proceedings the person against whom the proceedings were directed sustained injury to his reputation before the opportunity was afforded to clear his reputation. Learned Counsel urged that it was because of this fact that an action for damages for malicious prosecution lay where it was established, that proceedings under the Companies Act to wind up a trading company had been instituted maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause. In support of this contention he referred to a passage in the judgment of the Master of the Rolls in Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co. V/s. Eyre (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 674. The learned Master of the Rolls observed (page 684): By proceedings in bankruptcy a man's fair fame is injured just, as much since the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, as it was before because he is openly charged with insolvency before he can defend himself. It is not like (in action charging a merchant with fraud, when the evil done by bringing the action is remedied at the same time that the mischief is published, namely at the trial.