SHAIKH REYASAT Vs. GOPI NATH MISSIR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a defendants second appeal against concurrent decrees of the Courts below decreeing the plaintiffs claim for arrears of bhaoli rent due for the years 1339 to 1342-F. It was contended inter alia on behalf of the defendants that the claim was barred by limitation. Both the lower Courts however came to the conclusion that the suit was not barred and accordingly decreed the plaintiffs claim in full. Before us it has been contended by the appellants that the claim for rent with respect to the years 1339 and 1340 E is barred by time, though it is conceded that no such defence can apply to the claim for rent due for the years 1341 and 1342F. Previous to the year 1934, a landlord had three years in which to bring his suit. The matter was governed by Section 184 and Schedule III, 2(b)(ii) Bihar Tenancy Act. In the year 1934, an Amending Act was passed and this period of three years was reduced to one year. The time from which the period began to run was the same in both these Acts, namely the last day of the agricultural year in which the arrear fell due. The Amending Act of 1934 received the assent of the Governor-General on 14 November 1934, and it was provided that it should come into force at such time as was provided by an order to be made under the provisions of the Act. By an order made under the Act this provision relating to limitation came into force on 10 June 1935. It is clear therefore that all persons in this province were given a period from 14 November 1934 to 10 June 1935 to bring their suits, which, if not brought within that period, would be barred by the Amending Act.

(2.) It has been argued by Mr. Naqui Imam on behalf of the defendant-appellants that this Amending Act applied to all suits instituted after 10 June 1935, whether the cause of action had accrued or not before that date. On behalf of the respondents it has been contended that this Amending Act of 1934 cannot have the effect of taking away rights which had accrued before that Act came into force. This case came first before a single Judge, who has referred it to a Bench, because there is a conflict of opinion concerning the matter in this Court. In Rameshwar Prasad Singh V/s. Manger Kahar A.I.R (1937) Pat. 311. Rowland J. held that where a statute introduces a shorter period of limitation, suits instituted after the amendment in respect of cause of action accruing before such amendment will be governed by the amending law, the rule ordinarily applicable being the law which is in force at the time of the institution of the suit, and this principle will apply especially where there is an interval of time between the passing of the new Act and its coming into force. Consequently the shorter period of limitation of one year will apply to a suit for produce rent, the cause of action for which accrued before the passing of the 1934 Act amending the Bihar Tenancy Act. This is a case upon the statute with which we are now concerned. Rowland J. stresses the fact that there was an interval of time between the passing of this Amending Act and the date upon which it came into force. In Badri Narayan Singh V/s. Ganga Singh A.I.R (1937) Pat. 605 another case on the effect of this Amending Act, Courtney-Terrell C.J. came to a different conclusion. He held that a new law ought to be construed so as to interfere as little as possible with vested rights, and a statute is therefore not to be construed with greater retrospective operation than its language rendered necessary. Accordingly he held that the shorter period of limitation of one year as embodied in the new Bihar Tenancy Act was not applicable to a suit for produce rent, the cause of action for which had accrued before the passing of the new Amending Act. There can be no question whatsoever that this case is in direct conflict with the case decided by Rowland J. It is clear however from Courtney-Terrell C.J.'s judgment that it was not present to his mind that there was an interval of time between the passing of the Bihar Tenancy Amending Act of 1934 and the date upon which it came into force, namely 10 June 1935. At page 734 he observes: Applying these principles of construction to the Bihar Tenancy Act and to the facts of this case, it becomes manifest that the period of limitation prescribed has not affected the vested right of the plaintiff who formally proceeded to sue in respect of the year 1340; and indeed upon general principles of justice this view has the further justification that by the time the Act was published, that is to say on 14 November 1934, the period of limitation which the Judge has held to be applicable would have already expired, with the result that the plaintiff's right of action would have been destroyed without notice to him.

(3.) In short, it is clear that the late learned Chief Justice was of opinion that the Amending Act of 1934 put an end to landlords rights the moment it was passed, though clearly this was not so. In my judgment, this case, Badri Narayan Singh v. Ganga Singh (A.I.R 1937 Pat. 605 is no authority on the facts of the present case, because the learned Chief Justice wrongly assumed that the Amending Tenancy Act came into force on the day upon which it was passed. The point under consideration was considered at considerable length in Manjhoori Bibi V/s. Akel Mahumed 17 C.W.N. 889. In that case the statute which amended the law of limitation came into force immediately. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court held that such a statute had no retrospective effect and could not affect rights which had become vested before it was enacted. Mookerjee J. observed: In my opinion, the cardinal and fundamental point in the case before me is that the Eastern Bengal and Assam Tenancy Amendment Act of 1908 came into operation the very moment it became law: consequently, if it were taken to affect preexisting causes of action, the effect would be absolutely to bar at once all actions where the cause of action had accrued more than the limited time before the statute was passed.