SRI RAJAH BOMMADEVARA VENKATARAYULU NAIDU BAHADUR ZAMINDAR GARU Vs. SRI RAJAH LANKA VENKATA RATTAMMA GARU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appeal and the revision petition have been heard together because they both arise out of the same litigation, but the questions raised in them are really quite different.

(2.) In the second appeal the only question is whether the lower Court was wrong in law in refusing to excuse the delay in filing the appeal. Quite clearly the lower Court was not wrong in its decision at all unless an application for copies filed on 10 August, 1932, can be regarded as an application not only for a copy of the judgment but also for a copy of the decree. The application in terms only asks for "a copy of the order" and it was not until 3 September, 1932, that, a memorandum was filed asking that the decree might be drafted and a copy of it might be granted. Now, if time had been running against the appellant until 3rd September, 1932, his appeal was time-barred. I am unable to say that the lower appellate Court committed any legal error in holding that the earlier application dated 10 August, 1932, was not an application for a copy of the decree and that there were no grounds for excising the delay. The result therefore is that the second appeal is dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal is refused.

(3.) The Civil Revision Petition relates to an order in review of an appellate judgment restoring a suit which had been dismissed for default. The review judgment was passed by a different District Judge from the gentleman who originally allowed the appeal, but this point is not 1 think material for the Judge who decided the appeal in the first instance actually admitted the review application and ordered notice of it. Now, the error which was put forward as an error on the face of the record justifying interference in review was an error of law which went to the root of the jurisdiction of the District Court which heard the appeal By Section 192 of the Madras Estates Land Act, Order 43, Civil Procedure Code, is excluded from the provisions governing procedure under the Estates Land Act. Therefore no appeal lay against the order of the Deputy Collector refusing to restore the suit which had been dismissed for default. It follows that the error of the learned Judge in allowing such an appeal was one which was apparent on the face of the record to any person well acquainted with the provisions of the Act by which the appeal was governed. No research was necessary into rulings in order to discover the nature of the error.