VEMULAPALLI RAMAKOTAYYA Vs. GUTHA VIRARAGHAVAYYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts necessary for the determination of this reference are briefly these: Vemulapalli Subbayya died in 1909, leaving a widow Seethamma, the 1st defendant and his mother Bapamma, the 3 defendant surviving him. On the 2nd of October, 1918, Seethamma executed a deed of gift in respect of some of the properties that came to her from her husband in favour of her own brother Veeraraghavayya who is impleaded as the 2nd defendant in this case. The gift was effected by means of a document which is filed as Exhibit I in the case, and on the 19 of October the plaintiff executed a document filed as Exhibit II which in effect is a complete relinquishment of all of his rights as prospective reversioner and also purports to give full consent to the transaction evidenced by Exhibit I, to which document indeed he was an attesting witness. The question is whether by reason of his action in these matters he is to be held to be precluded from challenging the transaction. The exact wording of the question is as follows: Where an alienation without necessity (Exhibit I) by a Hindu widow of property forming part of her deceased husband's estate is consented to by the next presumptive male reversioner who, however, receives no consideration for giving such consent, is the transaction binding on the consenting reversioner, if he succeeds to the estate after the death of the widow and of the female reversioner succeeding her?

(2.) There is a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad Court, Fateh Singh V/s. Thakur Rukmini Ramanji Maharaj (1923) I.L.R. 45 A. 339 (F.B.), which is directly in favour of the respondent here, and that in its turn was followed by a Full Bench of the Bombay Court, Akkawa v. Sayadkhan Mithekhan (1927) I.L.R. 51 B. 475 (F.B.). In substance the argument before us is that these cases are inconsistent with the Privy Council decision in the Goundan's case, Rangasami Goundan V/s. Nachiappa Goundan (1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 72 : I.L.R. 42 M. 523 : 36 M.L.J. 493 (P.C.).

(3.) The learned Judge who decided the Second Appeal, Ramesam, T., speaks in his judgment of the plaintiff, the prospective reversioner being estopped. In our opinion no question of estoppel arises in this case at all, for the essence of the doctrine of estoppel is that a person who acts on a representation of fact made to him by another person and is thereby damnified, is entitled to say that the person who made that representation cannot be heard to contest the truth of the facts which he himself asserted. The essence of the doctrine is that the person who acted on the faith of the assertion was damnified by so acting, and that feature is altogether absent in this case.