PRAG DATT TIWARI Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Court had the advantage of listening to very helpful arguments from the Assistant Government Advocate and from Mr. Hamid Hasan.

(2.) One Prag Datt complained to the police that certain persons committed an offence. This was done on the 9 October 1927. Subsequently he lodged a complaint in the Court of a Magistrate on the same allegations on 17 October, and the complaint was dismissed after inquiry, on 2 November, 1927. A revision application to the Court of the Magistrate was dismissed in December of that year. Subsequently the Superintendent of Police of Cawnpore sent a written complaint to the District Magistrate for the prosecution of Prag Datt on a charge under Section 211, I.P.C., and the trial is being held by a Deputy Magistrate Mr. Mathur. On 23 February last on objection being raised by Prag Datt as to the Magistrate's jurisdiction, the Magistrate gave reasons affirming his jurisdiction and directing the trial to proceed. A revision application from that order was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge of Cawnpore.

(3.) I do not agree with the summary view taken by the Judge that so long as there is a sanction by any authority it will be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 195, Criminal P.C. I have examined the case-law on the subject, and there appears to be conflict of authority between this Court and the Calcutta High Court, In a case like the present two Divisional Benches of the Calcutta High Court have held that the provisions of Section 195 (1)(b) would apply, and that there could be no prosecution without the sanction of the Court where the complaint was subsequently made in Court. In the present case it will be noticed that no such sanction was obtained. The judgment of the Bench in Brown V/s. Ananda Lal Mullick [1917] 44 Cal. 650 was delivered by the learned Chief Justice who has referred to a similar opinion given by another Bench of two Judges at about the same time The learned Chief Justice has commented on various rulings. His personal reason for holding the view that he did is given in the following words: To hold otherwise, might lead to unreasonable results, e.g. assume a case where the information to the police is followed up by a complaint of a similar nature and to the same effect in Court, which after investigation by a Magistrate is discharged: the persons who had been accused then applies to the Court for sanction to prosecute the person who laid the complaint for making a false charge in Court, the Court refuses such sanction. According to Mr. Gregory's argument, the person who had been accused can then proceed without any sanction against the prosecutor alleging that he made a false charge to the police in the thana relying on the same allegations and the same facts, which the Magistrate has already investigated and as to which he had refused his sanction. Such a construction would be most unreasonable and, in my judgment, is not warranted by the language of the statute.