GOVERNMENT PLEADER Vs. DATTATRAYA NARAYAN DESHPANDE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The opponent in this application, Mr. D.N. Deshpande, is a High Court pleader. He was enrolled as such on or about January 31, 1917, and has since been practising in the local subordinate Courts in Bombay. He was adjudicated an insolvent on March 16, 1925. According to his own statement in the application that he made to the Chief Justice on April 28, 1926, he had speculated in shares of different joint stock companies and on account of a crisis in the local stock exchange had incurred heavy losses to the extent of Rs. 40,000, The Official Assignee, in his report Exhibit B, says that the statement filed by him shows liabilities to the extent of Rs. 50,000 as loss in speculation, but that as the insolvent has not filed his schedule his actual liabilities cannot be definitely ascertained. On April 23, 1926, he applied to the Chief Justice, mentioning his adjudication and asking that during the pendency of the insolvency proceedings and after his discharge he might be granted leave to practise as a pleader of this Court, In making this application he was following precedents in the case of other High Court pleaders, who had similarly applied for permission to continue to practise as a pleader. We have before us a similar application that was made and granted in April 1922, and there have since been similar applications. There is an obvious reason for a High Court pleader reporting the fact that he has been adjudicated as an insolvent and requesting permission to continue to practise. Such an adjudication necessarily affects the insolvent's professional and social status. A Government Officer, for instance, is liable to dismissal if he is adjudicated an insolvent; a member of a club in many cases ipso facto ceases to be a member upon his adjudication. A person cannot be admitted to be a student for the Bar if he is an undischarged bankrupt, cf. Halsbury's Laws of England. Vol. II, paragraph (310, page 362; a trustee vacates his office Fawcett J-upon becoming an insolvent; and as a more relevant instance, in England, since 1906, a solicitor is liable not to have his practising certificate renewed, if he is an undischarged bankrupt: see Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. XXVI, paragraph 1190, at page 721, and the Solicitors Act 1906 ((i Edw. VII, c. 24) Section 1. It may, therefore, be taken as a settled practice of this Court that the sanad of a pleader, who has been adjudicated an insolvent, and who has not received his discharge, is liable to be suspended on the ground of there being "reasonable cause" for such suspension under Section 25 of the Bombay Pleaders Act XVII of 1920 or Clause 10 of the amended Letters Patent, 1865. The opponent, however, did receive permission to continue to practise from the late Chief Justice, as appears from the endorsement "Sanctioned" upon the application made by the opponent, The present question would probably not have arisen in these circumstances but for the fact that there was a subsequent adjudication of insolvency against the opponent on September 28, 1927. The explanation that is given for this in the affidavit of the opponent is that towards the end of 1926 he had to incur further debts for meeting expenses that are there specified, and that one of his creditors obtained a decree against him and upon it obtained a warrant of arrest against him, so that to prevent his arrest he was obliged to file a fresh petition in insolvency for debts to the extent of Rs. 2,500, while the first petition was still undisposed of. The Official Assignee in his report Exhibit B states that the opponent has shown liability to the extent of Rs. 2,500 as borrowed from different persons. But, here again, as he has not filed his schedule, his actual liabilities cannot be definitely ascertained It-is obvious that any permission that was granted in respect of the first insolvency cannot be held to cover a further insolvency, and Dewan Bahadur Rao for the opponent did not contest this. His position simply is that his client was under a misapprehension as to the necessity for a renewed permission after the filing of the second petition of insolvency; that he did not receive a letter which the Rsgistrar of this Court addressed to him on October 12, 1927, drawing his attention to the necessity of getting the sanction of the Chief Justice to practise as a pleader; that there was no intention of showing disrespect or ignoring the authority of this Court; and that his client expresses his regret for the failure to apply for permission at the proper time and asks that this may now be granted. In support of these statements there is the affidavit of the opponent made on March 28, 1928, and another by one Vithal Saggon Sawant made on the same day. The latter states that the letter which the Begistrar addressed to the opponent was handed to him and that he took delivery of it on behalf of the opponent, with a view to hand it over to him. This is corroborated by an entry in the local despatch book that is before us. The deponent has there signed "V. Savant for D.N. Deshpande, Vakil, High Court." He gays in his affidavit :- But I misplaced the said letter somewhere and consequently I forgot to tell him about the receipt of the said letter until I was asked by him about it yesterday, i. e., March 27, 1928.

(2.) If that statement is accepted, then, of course, it does support the position taken up by Dewan Bahadur Rao. We thought it necessary, however, to put some questions to Mr. Sawant by way of cross-examination, and the record of this is contained in Exhibit A. He first of all clearly stated more than once that he had left the services of Deshpande about the beginning of October 1927. When his attention was drawn to the fact that he had stated in his affidavit that he left his services in the beginning of 1927, whereas October 1927 could not properly be called the beginning of the year 1927, he still stuck to his statement that he left in the month of October. But subsequently he changed his story and said that he was in the service of some other pleaders in October, November a December, 1927. He was further asked about the letter and he said: I took the letter and put it in my coat-pocket among the brief-papers and many other letters and I forgot all about it. and that he never thought any more about the letter, although he had undertaken to hand it over to Mr. Deshpande. We have no hesitation both from the demeanour of this clerk under cross-examination and his vacillation in entirely disbelieving his story. We feel no doubt whatever that the statement that he put the letter away and forgot all about it is a pure invention; and in the circumstances we cannot accept the explanation of the opponent that this letter from the Registrar never reached him. It is to be noted that there was a delay of over a year in the first application to the late Chief Justice after the first insolvency, and we think the circumstances strongly point to the opponent endeavouring to delay as long as possible in making a second application, especially as he might have reason to think from the Registrar's communication that that permission might be refused.

(3.) In our opinion, this Court in its disciplinary jurisdiction has full power to suspend the sanad of a pleader, it he has been adjudicated an insolvent, until he obtains a discharge, if, in the circumstances of the case, it considers that the insolvency coupled with the surrounding circumstances supplies a reasonable cause for such a suspension. It is largely a matter of discretion. The Chief Justice receiving an application of this kind can well be satisfied from the circumstances that are put forward that there is no objection to grant an insolvent pleader permission to continue to practise, and in doing so he would be acting on behalf of the Court, but if he considers that the case is one where there is reason to doubt the advisability of granting such permission, he can ask the Government Pleader to bring it before the Court in its disciplinary jurisdiction. That has been the action taken in the present case. We have, therefore to consider whether in all the circumstances we should exercise that jurisdiction and hold that there is no objection to the opponent continuing to practise, while he is an undischarged bankrupt, or whether the circumstances show reasonable cause for suspending his sanad during that period.