SURESH CHANDRA CHATTERJEE Vs. KANTI CHANDRA BHATTACHARJEE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from the decree of the Additional District Judge of 24-Parganas in a suit in ejectment. The appellant became the tenant under the plaintiff in respect of premises, 17/2-A, Kundu Lane, Bhowanipur, in the suburbs of Calcutta, at a monthly rent of Rs. 50, in 1920. Subsequently the parties went to the Rent Controller to fix the standard rent of the premises under the Rant Act of 1920 which was then in-force. The rent was fixed by the Rent Controller at Rs. 39 a month. On 14th. March 1925 the plaintiff gave a notice to the defendant asking him to vacate the premises by the e March, 1925. The defendant not having vacated within the time allowed to him, the present suit was instituted on 13 May 1925 for ejectment against the defendant. The trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the defendant was protected from ejectment under the provisions of Section 11, Rent Act. This order was pronounced on 30 July 192Q. There was an appeal by the plaintiff against the decree of the trial Court. The appeal came on for hearing on 29 July 1927. In the meantime the Rent Act expired and ceased to exist. The Rent Act was originally passed in 1920 in respect of all premises in and about Calcutta and came into operation from 5 May 1920. The Act was originally enacted for three years but by subsequent enactment it was extended up to 31 March 1924. Before it expired another Act was introduced and the Rent Act got a fresh lease of life till 31 March 1927, but only in respect of premises of which the rent was below Rs. 250 a month so that so far as the premises in question are concerned the Rant Act must be taken to have affected them till it expired on 31 March 1927.

(2.) The appeal was heard by the learned Third Additional District Judge, 24-Parganas and allowed. The learned Judge decreed that the defendant should vacate the premises in suit within one month from the date of judgment which was 29 July 1927 and he was further directed to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 39 a month from 1 April 1925 till possession was delivered. The learned Judge took a different view of the facts relied upon by the trial Court and he found that the defendant did not pay the rent regularly to the plaintiff or deposit it in the Rent Controller's Court and was therefore not protected from ejectment by virtue of the provision of Sub-section 5 of Section 11 of the Act. He was also of opinion that the evidence in the case went to show that there was no preliminary tender of rent to the landlord before it was deposited in the Rent Controller's office and hence it was not a proper payment of rent within Sub-clause 4, Section 11, Rent Act. We have examined these - clauses in the light of the evidence in the case and the findings of the first Court and we do not think that they can be supported. But the learned vakil for the respondent has supported the decree passed by the appellate Court upon a different ground, namely, that on 29 July 1927 there was no Rent Act in operation and the defendant's tenancy having been terminated by a valid notice he was liable to be ejected and hence the decree of the lower appellate Court is correct. This seems to be the correct position to take. Under the general law a landlord is entitled to determine the tenancy of a tenant under him by a valid notice and he is further entitled to recover possession of the property let out to the tenant on the termination of the tenancy. This right of the landlord for a certain period became interrupted by the Rent Act which laid down certain circumstances in which recovery of possession of land could not be obtained by the landlord. That bar ceased to exist on 31 March 1927. On the day on which the learned Judge delivered his judgment the law which is the general law under the Transfer of Property Act was in operation and he having found that the tenancy was validly determined he had authority to pass a decree ordering ejectment of the defendant. The effect of a temporary Act running out and ceasing to have any further operation has been considered in many cases. The principle is thus laid down in Craies on Statute Law, 3 edn., at p. 342: As a general rule and unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired no proceedings can be taken upon it and it ceases to have any further effect.... As soon as the Act expires any proceedings which are being taken against a person will ipso facto terminate.

(3.) In Quilter V/s. Mapleson [1882] 9 Q.B.D. 672 it was held that the Court of appeal could grant to a party relief to which he was entitled according to the law as it stood at the hearing of the appeal. In his judgment Bowen, D.J. observed: The rules were intended to enable the Court of appeal to do complete justice. If the law has been altered pending the appeal, it seems to me to be pressing rules of procedure too far to say that the Court of appeal cannot decide according to the existing state of the law.