MARRI NARASAYYA Vs. PERURI KRISHNAMURTHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Mr. Rama Rao for the defendants, who are the appellants here, has urged three points. He has urged that Ex. A, which purports to show the contents of an entry in an official birth register and has been used to fix the date of the plaintiff's birth, is inadmissible in evidence as it is a copy of a copy. But the learned Subordinate Judge has found that it was admitted by consent in the trial Court and has therefore rightly refused to reject it. I agree with Mr. Rama Rao that, even if a document is admitted to the record by con sent, that alone will not enable either party to prove by that document anything which under the Evidence Act cannot be proved. But, if the parties consent that for the purposes of the case it shall be treated as showing the contents of some other document, then, although the contents of that other document could not be proved under the Act by the document produced, that is of no consequence. The parties may, if they wish, admit the contents of a document not produced and may admit that those contents are correctly shown by any paper produced even if what is written on it purports to be fifty times a copy. The Subordinate Judge has relied on the decision of Devadoss, J., in Latchayya V/s. Seetaramayya . Assuming that what happened in the original Court in that case was what Davadoss, J., assumed or inferred had happened I respectfully agree with his decision. In the present case I understand from the judgment and records that in the trial Court it was admitted that Ex. A correctly represented the entry in the original birth register; and the Subordinate Judge has found that the entry refers to the plaintiff. The admission having been made, it was unnecessary to prove in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act what the entry in the original register was.

(2.) Mr. Rama Rao's second objection is that Ex. B, the bond on which the plaintiff sues, was executed in favour, not of the plaintiff, but of his adoptive mother. The bond runs in favour of "Seetamma Garu, adoptive mother and guardian of Peruri Krishnamurthi" (the plaintiff). It is contended that the words following "Seetamma Garu" are only descriptive of her and do not indicate that she was concerned in the transaction only as the guardian of this plaintiff. There is some ambiguity about the wording of the document, though to give the description of the person in whose favour the document is executed as the adoptive mother and guardian of a minor would be most unusual. However it is not necessary to discuss this point as the defendants admitted in their written statement that the bond was executed in favour of the plaintiff.

(3.) The important point raised in this appeal is a question of limitation. The ordinary period of limitation for the suit expired long before it was instituted; but, as the plaintiff was a minor at the time from which limitation had to be reckoned, he was entitled to institute the suit within three years from the date on which he became a major by the provisions of Secs.6 and 8, Lim. Act. Those three years expired during the vacation of the trial Court, and the plaint was presented about a month later, on the day on which the Court re-opened. The plaint would be within time if Section 4 of the Act applied to such a case. Mr. Rama Rao contends that Section 4 does not apply and that the plaintiff can get his three years under Secs.6 and 8 but no more. His argument is that "the period of limitation prescribed" to which Section 4 applies, must be "the period of limitation prescribed therefor by Schedule 1", as mentioned in Section 3 and that the special extension granted by Section 6 is not a period of limitation prescribed by the schedule. In Narasimha Deo Garu V/s. Krishna Chandra , Abdur Rahim and Spencer, JJ., agreed that the two months, which must be added to a period of limitation under Section 15 (2) cannot be added on to the extension of three years given by Secs.6 and 8, implying that the three years given by these sections is not a period of limitation; but both learned Judges held that the suit was barred for another reason. In Subbarayan V/s. Natarajan A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 263, Spencer, J., expressed the opinion that the words "period of limitation prescribed" in Section 15 (1) of the Act means the period prescribed by the schedule and Ramesam, J., at p. 795 said that a "period of limitation" probably does not include a mere period of extension such as that given by Secs.6 and 8. In neither of these cases was Section 4 particularly considered. In Shevdas Daulatram V/s. Narayanan Asaji , Section 4 was considered in connexion with the special temporary extension of two years given by Section 31. It was held in that case that the special period of two years was not a "period of limitation prescribed" and that to the expiry of that period Section 4 did not apply But dissent from that case was expressed by Sadasiva Aiyar and Spencer JJ., in Murugesa Mudali V/s. Ramaswami Mudali in which it was decided that Section 4 did apply to the special, extension of two years given by Section 31; and the learned Judges spoke of that period: of two years as a "period of limitation prescribed by Section 31". They stated also that they ad-opted the reasoning in Hira Singh V/s. Mt. Amarti [1912] 34 All 375, in which one learned Judge definitely held that Section 4 applies to the period of two years given by Section 31 and dissented from 36 Bom. 268 and the other appears to have agreed with him, though he discussed; mainly another aspect of the case. No decision dealing directly with the application of Section 4 to the period of extension given by Secs.6 and 8 has been brought to my notice.