(1.) The present case must be decided on the provisions of the Contract Act. Analogies drawn from the English common law where the contract of a minor is only voidable, are wholly inappropriate when we have a codified law in this country. Since the case of Mohori Bibee V/s. Dharmodas Ghose, [1903] 30 Cal. 539 it is now settled law that a contract by a minor is not only voidable, but is altogether void. But although such a contract is void, it cannot be said to be prohibited by law or otherwise unlawful. Nor does any question of public policy arise. Section 23 is inapplicable.
(2.) Under Section 11 a minor is not competent to contract. He is disqualified from contracting. He can, therefore, neither make a valid proposal, nor make a valid acceptance as defined in Section 2, Clauses (a) and (b). He cannot, therefore, for the purposes of the Act be strictly called a promisor within the meaning of Clause (c). Nor can, therefore, anything done by the promisee be strictly called a consideration at the desire of a promisor as contemplated by Cl (d). It may, therefore, be urged that an agreement by a minor cannot be strictly described as being one for "consideration" as defined in the Act. It is not, however necessary to decide this point.
(3.) The question before us is whether consideration received by a person during his minority can be a good consideration for a fresh promise by him after his attaining majority. No doubt under Section 2 a past consideration may be a good consideration, but that past consideration must be an existing one and a valid one. Section 25 is the only section which declares that an agreement made without consideration is void. The whole question is whether such a transaction falls within Section 25, Sub-clause (2).