KAZI BAZLUR RAHMAN Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The accused in this case was charged under Section 302, I.P.C., with having committed the murder of Mr. G.H.W. Davies, I.C.S., District Magistrate and Collector of Chittagong, on 20 April 1928, and was tried before the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Chittagong Mr. A.E. Porter and a jury.

(2.) It was urged on behalf of the accused in the Committing Magistrate's Court and also in the Sessions Court that at the time when it was alleged that he had committed the murder in question he was of unsound mind and that, in the circumstances, he was not responsible for what he did. The jury unanimously found the accused guilty under Section 302, I.P.C., and further that the accused could not claim any exemption under the provisions of Section 84, I.P.C. In answer to a question put by the learned Sessions Judge, whether the jury were of opinion that the accused was of unsound mind at all, six of the jurors were of opinion that he was not but the remaining three thought that he might have been. The learned Judge accepted the unanimous verdict of the jury and sentenced the accused to death. The learned Judge observed as follows: I agree with the minority of the jury that the accused was of unsound mind at the time when the crime was committed. As there is a clear finding that his unsoundness of mind was not such as to exempt him from criminal liability, however, I do not consider that this opinion, especially in view of the finding of the majority of the jury, justifies the imposition of any sentence by me save the maximum. I therefore sentence the accused to be hanged by the neck until he be dead, subject to the confirmation of the High Court.

(3.) In his letter of reference to this Court the learned Judge further observed as follows: There is clear oral evidence on the record that the conduct of the accused for some considerable time preceding the commission of the offence was such as is identical or analogous with conduct upon observation of which the Civil Surgeon declared it to be his opinion that the accused is of unsound mind; there is no reason to disbelieve this evidence and it is corroborated by a considerable number of documents, in the proved handwriting of the accused, which must have been in preparation over a long period and which there is no reason to believe to have been fabricated for any fraudulent purpose. There appears to me to be no ground for holding that the madness displayed by the accused was feigned. I am clearly of opinion that, upon the evidence, the jury erred in not finding that the accused was of unsound mind when he committed the crime although I hold that, there is nothing to show that, even so, ho is entitled to the benefit of Section 84, I.P.C. In view of the clear verdict of the jury, however, I did not consider it open to me to give effect to my own conviction that the accused is of unsound mind and was so when he committed the offence.